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TREATMENT RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The past seventeen years have witnessed a major reform of the
mental health system in the United States. The most obvious
indicator of change has been the massive exodus of mental patients
to the community." The marked reduction in the patient census
of mental hospitals, however, is not invariably associated with "suc-
cessful" treatment of the mentally ill.2 Rather, advances in psycho-
tropic drugs, right to treatment and right to liberty litigation on
behalf of involuntarily confined mental patients,3 and the shift from
state to federal funding have been the major determinants of dis-
charge. The decline in mental hospital populations may be further
deceiving. A mentally ill individual who in earlier years would
have been likely to be a long term chronic patient may today be
characterized by "revolving door syndrome;" his or her medical
history is marked by a series of admissions, discharges, and readmis-
sions.4 For an increasing number of the mentally ill, this history
culminates in admission to a nursing home.r
1 The decline of the long term population of state mental hospitals occurred
swiftly. From a peak patient population of 633,504 in 1955, it dropped to 427,799
in 1969 and 237,691 in 1974. STAFF OF SuBcomonv. ON LoNG TmP m CARE oF THE
SENATE SPEcIAL Com. oN ACING, 94Tn CONG:, 2D SEss., NuESiNG Ho sE CAtE iN
THE UNITED STATES: FAmIunE ix P Poacy, TEm RoLE OF NunsiNG Ho ms 3N
CAWNG Fon DiscAcFD MErrAL PAmN'rrs AND TEE Bmm OF A FoR-PoFrE
BoAnDiNG Hoimn INnusm (supporting paper No. 7) 718 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter cited as NmrSING Hoims AND MENTAL PATIENTS]. Wholesale dis-
mantling of state mental hospitals has occurred in several states, including California,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts and is underway in Minnesota. See
generally THE FuroRE RoLE OF THE STATE HosPrrAL (J. Zusman & E. Bertsch eds.
1974) [hereinafter cited as Zusman & Bertsch]. For an excellent historical review
of changes in the mental health field, see Kahn, The Mental Health System and
the Future Aged, 15 GEmoNToLocisT 24 (1975).
2 Rather than being cured, many patients are discharged only to be readmitted
later. This phenomenon is commonly called the "revolving door" syndrome among
mental health professionals. Thus although the average daily census of mental
hospitals is only half the 1955 level, the number of readmissions is higher than
ever, as is the total number of people processed through the mental health system.
Demone & Schulberg, Has the State Mental Hospital a Future as a Human Service
Resource?, in Zusman & Bertsch, supra note 1, ch. 1; see Kahn, supra note 1, at 25.
3 E.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
4 Note 2 supra. One study in Wisconsin found an average of five admissions
per mental patient, with approximately one third of the mental patients having a
mean of five admissions per year during the period of the study. Letter from Dr.
Leonard I. Stein to Cynthia Barnett (May 10, 1977) (copy on file, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review). See also Stein, Test & Mart, Alternative to the Hospital,
132 A. J. PsYcH. 517 (1975).
5 Approximately two-thirds of discharged Connecticut state mental hospital
patients were referred to nursing homes. In the 1960's, most nursing home place-
ments were of the elderly mental patients. Beginning in 1975, however, the great
majority of discharges to nursing homes were of mental patients under 65. F. Red-
lich & S. Kellert, Trends in American Psychiatry: A Preliminary Report on Changes
1978]
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The greatest reduction in census admissions and readmissions
at mental hospitals involves the elderly. 6 This is a distinct re-
versal of earlier trends. Historically, the aged were disproportion-
ately overrepresented in mental hospitals.7 Thousands of geriatric
patients have been transferred to nursing homes. Today most of
the institutionalized aged mentally ill are nursing home residents.8
In addition to the elderly mentally ill, primarily those who are
senile and those with chronic brain syndrome,9 growing numbers of
younger, ambulatory, indigent psychotics are appearing in nursing
homes.10 Nursing homes also absorb many individuals living in
the community who, prior to the strict admission criteria estab-
lished by right to treatment litigation, would have been candidates
for mental hospitalization." The expanding role of the nursing
home in the care of psychiatric patients approaches to a distressing
degree that predicted prior to the advent of mental hospital re-
form: "If all the mental hospitals . . . were emptied and closed
in Psychiatric Care in an Urban Area of the United States 9 (1976) (unpublished
paper submitted to Yale University School of Medicine; copy on file, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
0 NuIsrNG Horms AND MENTAL PATMNTS, supra note 1, at 704. From 1969
to 1974, the elderly portion of the mental hospital population decreased by 58%,
as compared to a 44% drop in the total mental hospital population.
7 Kahn, supra note 1, at 26. For example, in 1969, the elderly, who comprised
approximately 10% of the general population, accounted for more than a third of
the greater than one-half million citizens in mental hospitals. NuisiNG HomEs AND
MENTAL PATENTS, supra note 1, at 703.
8 State mental hospitals house 59,685 mentally ill over 65 years in age where
they comprise 25% of the 1974 census of those hospitals. NuRsING Ho,ms AND
M T.L PATiENTS, supra note 1, at 270. In contrast, there were 1,106,103 nursing
home residents in 1971, STAFF OF SUBCOmm. N LONG Txmar CARE OF THE SENATE
SP EcIL Co.vr. oN AGING, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., NUxsING Hovm CARE IN THE
UNrrED STATES: FAILUnE IN PuBLIC PoLicy, INTRODUCTORY REPORT 15 (Comm.
Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as LNTRODUCToRY REPORT], of whom "widely sup-
ported data established that 55 percent or more ... are mentally impaired." Id. 17.
9 The term chronic brain syndrome describes a number of organic brain dis-
orders resulting from impairment of brain tissue which is relatively permanent and
usually irreversible. The original pathological process may subside or respond to
treatment but the brain tissue destruction cannot be corrected.
1OF. Redlich & S. Kellert, supra note 5, at 9. A random sample of 228
patients released from Alabama's Bryce Hospital was taken in 1972-1973 in the
aftermath of Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), enforcing 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The study found that 19% of those surveyed were
living in nursing homes; among patients who were 60 years of age or younger,
15.5% were in nursing homes. Leaf, Patients Released After Wyatt: Where Did
They Go?, 28 Hosp. & CoMMUNIT PsYcH. 366, 369 (1977).
11 Strict involuntary commitment rulings require the conditions of both mental
illness and dangerousness, either to oneself or to society, for involuntary patients
in state hospitals. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473
(1974), enforced, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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down today, tomorrow relatives, police, and judges would raise a
clamor for new ones; and these true clients of the mental hospital
would demand an institution to satisfy their needs." 12
The impetus for the fulfillment of this prophecy came in part
from the right to treatment litigation waged on behalf of involun-
tarily committed mental patients. In the course of this litigation,
various courts established-first on statutory 13 and later on consti-
tutional grounds 14-that these patients enjoy a right to treatment.
This development undoubtedly had the salutary effect of improv-
ing conditions for many patients who remained committed in state
mental institutions. 5 The impact of those decisions did not stop
there, however; in response to the increased cost of maintaining
inpatients due to the right to treatment litigation, many states en-
gaged in the indiscriminate "dumping" of patients."6 The nursing
home became a popular dumping grounds.17  Consequently, many
mental patients who enjoyed a new found right to treatment were
soon transferred to a new setting where although their mental con-
dition had not improved, they were again without a right to treat-
ment. These patients could take little comfort in the thought that
their keepers were now a for-profit industry rather than the state.' s
12E. GoFF7, AsyLmis 384 (1961).
13 See text accompanying notes 27-30 infra.
'4 See text accompanying notes 31-33 & 39-43 infra.
15 See text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
16 David Mechanic, a leading medical sociologist, was one of the first to per-
ceive that the focus of the right to treatment movement on the institutional setting
alone was having this untoward result:
It is only now becoming apparent to what extent greatly impaired
patients have been "dumped" in the community without adequate financial
and social resources. In the big cities . . . many impaired patients live
with other deviants in "welfare hotels" in disorganized areas where they
are frequently intimidated and frightened. With poor community care,
these patients frequently experience an exacerbation of symptoms and inse-
curities and, in view of their limited coping capacities, they face horren-
dous life problems. . . . In the case of schizophrenic patients, it is
recognized that aggressive care is required if they are not to regress; but
under most community circumstances, this care is not available and former
patients simply become lost in the community.
D.. IVIcCIMC, Pora-ncs, MnrIcM-r, AND SocrAL SCIENcE 232 (1974).
17 See B. STorsry, Tim Nunsn~Ic Homm AD T= AGED Psym&miuc PAT-NT
17 (1970); Redick, Patterns in Use of Nursing Homes by the Aged Mentally ill,
Statistical Note 107 (HEW Pub. No. (ADM) 74-69) Health 3735-157, at 2 (1974).
18 Although not addressed in detail in this Article, the potential conflict between
profit and rehabilitation under the present scheme of reimbursement should be
recognized. One difficulty in placing patients in need of treatment in nursing
homes is the possibility that treatment that could aid the patient might be viewed
as too costly by the administrator concerned with profitability of the organization.
Nursing home administrators are typically neither mental health professionals nor
physicians. Having no expertise in health care, they are probably less sensitive
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It would be a sad finale to the right to treatment movement if this
were the last chapter of its history. Such ironies are not unknown
in the mental health field, however; Dorothea Dix's humanitarian
efforts in the last century got the mentally ill out of the prisons and
into mental hospitals where they languished for half a century.10
One purpose of this Article is to examine the treatment rights of
former mental patients living in nursing homes to see if a similar
Pyrrhic victory can be averted.
Although the applicability of the initial decisions beyond the
confines of the mental institution has been discussed in the right to
treatment movement,20 that question has remained largely unan-
swered. Because the number of mentally ill persons confined in
nursing homes today exceeds the number of mentally ill in mental
hospitals at the beginning of the right to treatment litigation,21 this
unanswered question is particularly disturbing. Two comple-
mentary phenomena account for this problem: the paucity of socio-
logical and medical writings on nursing home residents 22 and the
absence of legal action on their behalf. Although the elderly com-
than these professionals to the rehabilitation potential of patients. Some reductions
in operating expenses may be justified from a cost perspective, but investigations
of nursing home care suggest that this tendency to reduce operating expenses
has very serious health care costs and human consequences. See generally Shulman
and Galanter, Reorganizing the Nursing Home Industry: A Proposal, 54 MmYBAN
MEMORIAL FUND QUARTELY/HEALTH Ai SocrTY 129 (1976).
19 David Rothman has insightfully taken this prospect further to suggest that
the reforms in deinstitutionalization may eventually resurrect the use of the asylum:
But what is to become of those whose release has been won in this way?
And what effects will these haphazard releases have on the well-being of
society? Already a new breed of horror story is beginning to circulate
about the "community-based" boarding houses to which a number of for-
mer inmates have been removed. Some keepers, it seems, are giving their
charges breakfast and then locking them in all day; others are feeding them
breakfast and locking them out all day. Ten years accumulation of these
incidents, and someone will come up with the bright idea that a thousand
settings are more difficult to oversee than one. "If only we would con-
solidate the boarding houses into a central system, put them all under one
roof . . ." In essence, unless those now litigating for decarceration think
hard and clear about alternatives, we may soon rediscover the asylum.
Rothman, Decarcerating Prisoners and Patients, 1 Civ. Lm. RPv. 8, 22-23 (1973).
20 See Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering
Institutional Change, 84 YAL-E L.J. 1338, 1373-74 (1975).
21 See note 8 supra.
22 For example, in medical sociology, although an abundance of literature
concerns mental hospitals and patients, general hospitals, and doctor-patient relation-
ships, practically no literature on nursing homes or residents exists, despite the fact
that nursing home residents outnumber mental hospital patients or general hospital
patients and that present demographic trends show the elderly to be the fastest
growing segment of the population. Presently one out of five old people will be
a nursing home resident at some time. Kastenbaum & Candy, The 4% Fallacy:
A Methodological and Empirical Critique of Extended Care Facility Population
Statistics, 4 IN-r'L J. AGDYG & HumAN DEv. 15 (1973).
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prise the nation's largest poverty group,28 and are highly vulnerable
to mental hospital commitment, nursing home placement, and
other involuntary proceedings, they have exceedingly low per capita
litigation rates.24 Their lack of litigiousness may be partly at-
tributable to special characteristics of the elderly population, such
as poor health, lack of familiarity with the legal system, lack of
education, reticience, fear of retaliation, and a high incidence of
mental illness. 25 But private lawyers and the public interest bar,
including those specifically interested in mental health issues, have
also neglected the legal needs of the elderly. The neglect of the
mentally ill nursing home resident contrasts sharply with the recent
interest in acutely mentally ill patients. Efforts on their behalf have
created much-needed hospital reform. To consolidate victories on
that front, attention must now be devoted to the nursing home
resident. Neither the mental health bar, the judiciary, nor the
public can rest content with the thought that this problem is only
temporary. Specifically, the problem of the placement of ex-mental
patients in nursing homes is no longer confined to the elderly but
now encompasses younger, "recycled" mental patients. This prob-
lem can be expected to intensify, given the direction of mental
health policy and demographic trends.
20
This Article will therefore consider the status of the right to
treatment of ex-mental patients residing in nursing homes. This
question cannot be dealt with in vacuo, of course, but rather must
be set within the context of the plight of the elderly and the condi-
tions of nursing homes in general. The foundation of the right to
treatment-both statutory and constitutional-will be reviewed as
that right arose in the context of mental institutions. One particular
aspect of that right, the requirement that treatment be administered
in the least restrictive setting possible, will be particularly scruti-
nized to determine if nursing homes are in fact less restrictive alter-
natives to mental institutions. This evaluation will lead to a
discussion of the extension of the right to treatment to ex-mental
23 For a discussion of the magnitude of the poverty faced by elderly persons,
see Kreps, The Economics of Aging, in TnE FurruR oF Aocrt A THE AGED 9-17
(G. Maddox ed. 1971).
24 See Nathanson, Legal Services for the Nation's Elderly, 17 Asuz. L. IRxv.
275 (1975).
25 See Health Law Project, Legal Problems Inherent in Organizing Nursing
Home Occupants, 6 CLEAnrciaousE RFv. 203 (1972); Nathanson, Legal Services
for the Nation's Elderly, 17 Az. L. REv. 275 (1975).
26 The age composition of the United States is changing rapidly; 10% of the
population was over 65 in 1974. The fastest growing of all population groups is
the over 75 category, the major pool of nursing home residents. LrrnoDUCroky
REFonT, supra note 8, at 14.
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patients residing in nursing homes. Statutory, contractual, and con-
stitutional dimensions will be explored. In regard to the latter, the
involuntary, voluntary, and "volunteered" patient will be considered
in turn. Finally, the efficacy of treating elderly patients will be
considered, for if such treatment is totally ineffective, any legal
victories in this regard would be meaningless.
II. FOUNDATION OF THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT
Judicial recognition of a right to treatment first arose in the
context of mental institutions. In Rouse v. Cameron 27 the peti-
tioner, who had been committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital follow-
ing his acquittal by reason of insanity, sought habeas corpus relief.
Judge Bazelon, noting that "[t]he purpose of involuntary hospitali-
zation is treatment, not punishment," 28 based his finding of a right
to treatment for those involuntarily committed to mental institu-
tions on statutory grounds. 29 Under the court's construction of the
relevant statute, if treatment were inadequate or otherwise inap-
propriate, conditional or unconditional release might be the appro-
priate remedy. 30
Although the decisions in Rouse and other right to treatment
cases in the District of Columbia Circuit were based on statutory
grounds,31 the court's opinion in Rouse suggested that the right
could be predicated on constitutional grounds such as due process,
equal protection, or the prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment.32 As a result of the constitutional implications of the Rouse
decision, one court found a constitutional right to treatment for
mentally retarded patients civilly committed to state institutions:
"As to the statutory basis for Rouse and other District of Columbia
cases, the language and reasoning of those decisions clearly reflect
the view that the construction of the statute calling for a right to
treatment was an alternative to invalidating the statute on constitu-
tional grounds." 33
27373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The petitioner had been charged with
carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor with a maximum prison sentence of
one year.
28 Id. 452 (footnote omitted).
29 Id. 454 (construing D.C. CoDE: ANN. § 24-301 (1961)).
30 See id. at 458-59.
31 See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Millard v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
32 373 F.2d at 453.
33 Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 495 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part and
remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
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Elaboration of a constitutional right to treatment depends in
part upon the state's purpose in committing the individual; the
underlying premise of that right differs depending on the state's
purpose. For example, when a commitment is based upon the state's
parens patriae3 power to protect an individual deemed dangerous
to himself, a due process analysis applies. This rationale, which is
the cornerstone of most right to treatment cases, has been articulated
as follows:
1) Where an individual's liberty is as drastically curtailed
as it is in civil commitment, 2) without the procedural safe-
guards of the criminal process, 3) and the lack of such safe-
guards is justified by the benevolent purpose of the state in
affording needed treatment to the individual, 4) due
process requires that he receive such treatment as will give
him a reasonable chance to improve or be cured.
35
But where the state is acting pursuant to its police power to protect
.society from the acts of individuals who are considered dangerous
because of severe mental illness although they violated no criminal
statute, a quid pro quo rationale is advanced:
[L]ong term detention of an individual, as a matter of
due process, has been traditionally permitted only when
an individual (1) is proved in a proceeding subject to strict
procedural due process limitations (2) to have committed a
specific act which is defined as an offense against the state.
Also, (3) generally this detention is only for a limited
period of time. Thus, when these three constitutional
limitations are missing, there must be a quid pro quo ex-
tended by the government in order to justify commitment.
The most generally recognized quid pro quo is treatment."
Similarly, it has been argued that confinement without treat-
ament may be a violation of eighth amendment rights. This argument
is based on Robinson v. California 37 which held that imprisonment
for narcotics addiction, without treatment, was cruel and unusual
punishment.38 By analogy, involuntary institutionalization of an
34 For a discussion of the state's patens patriae power, see Lynch v. Baxley,
:386 F. Supp. 378, 390-91 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
35 Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Committed Mental
Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HAuv. L. BEv. 1282, 1287 (1973).
36 D. Greenley, The Right to Treatment and Related Concepts 2-3 (1976)
(discussion paper prepared for Center for Public Representation, Madison, Wis.;
copy on file, University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (footnote omitted).
37370 U.S. 660 (1961).
38 Id. 666-67.
586 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
individual based on the individual's status as mentally ill without
the provision of adequate treatment would appear to be cruel and
unusual punishment. Only treatment provides a constitutionally
permissible rationale for commitment.
The landmark case of Wyatt v. StickneyD which involved the
rights of mental patients at Bryce State Mental Hospital in Alabama,
was the first to espouse a right to treatment on constitutional
grounds. It also marked the first judicial decree of minimum
standards of treatment for involuntarily committed mental patients.
In Wyatt, Judge Johnson held that
The patients at Bryce Hospital, for the most part, were
involuntarily committed through noncriminal procedures
and without the constitutional protections that are afforded
defendants in criminal proceedings. When patients are so
committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably
have a constitutional right to receive such individual treat-
ment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be
cured or to improve his or her mental conditions. [citations
omitted]. Adequate and effective treatment is constitution-
ally required because, absent treatment, the hospital is
transformed "into a penitentiary where one could be held
indefinitely for no convicted offense." [citation omitted]
The purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment
purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care or pun-
ishment. This is the only justification, from a constitu-
tional standpoint, that allows civil commitments to mental
institutions such as Bryce.
40
According to the precepts established by Judge Johnson,
patients involuntarily confined in any state operated mental health
facility are constitutionally entitled to adequate and effective treat-
ment for their mental illness. The three requisites for such treat-
ment are "1) a humane psychological and physical environment, 2)
qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer adequate treat-
39344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing 325
F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, decision reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit's opinion upheld the district court's constitutional
analysis and treatment standards. For an extensive discussion of the course of the
Wyatt litigation, see Note, supra note 20, at 1347-52.
40 325 F. Supp. at 784.
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ment and 3) individualized treatment plans." 41 Bryce was found
deficient in each area.4
The standards Judge Johnson mandated for the state institu-
tions involved-Bryce and Searcy, institutions for the mentally ill,43
and Partlow, an institution for the mentally retarded 44-are a signi-
ficant aspect of the decision. These standards require far more than
custodial care.46  The Wyatt litigation revealed the deficiencies of
Alabama mental institutions; 46 the decision's impact on those insti-
tions is most immediately obvious. Through considerable financial
outlay, the state of Alabama has markedly upgraded its mental
institutions.47 In addition to improving quality of care within its
41334 F. Supp. at 1343. By this time the plaintiff class had been enlarged to
include involuntarily confined patients in the only two other mental institutions in
Alabama. Id. 1342 n.1.
42 Id. 1343.
43 The decree for Bryce-Searcy set forth specific standards guaranteeing
basic patient rights to privacy and dignity, "the least restrictive conditions
necessary to achieve the purposes of commitment," presumption of com-
petency, communication with outsiders (including "unrestricted . . .visita-
tion with attorneys and with private physicians and other health profes-
sionals"), freedom from unnecessary medication or restraint, freedom from
experimentation and unusual or hazardous treatment ("such as lobotomy,
electro-convulsive treatment, adversive reinforcement conditioning. ..")
without informed consent, suitable opportunities for supervised interaction
with members of the opposite sex, and compensation facilities, sanitary
facilities, floor space, nutrition, staff-to-patient ratios, and educational op-
portunities. The court ordered the development of individual treatment
plans (to include "a statement of the least restrictive conditions necessary
to achieve the purposes of commitment" and "criteria for release to less
restrictive treatment conditions, and criteria for discharge"), the filing of
written medication and physical restraint orders, and periodic review of
these orders.
NATioxAL AsS'N OF ATroRNmvs GENEnAL, THE RiGHT TO TnEATMENT iN MENTAL
HEALTH LANW 23-24 (1976) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as NAAG].
44 The decree for Partlow set forth standards guaranteeing retarded persons
basic rights to adequate "habilitation" (defined as "the process by which
the staff of the institution assists the resident to acquire and maintain
those life skills which enable him to cope more effectively with the
demands of his own person and of his environment and to raise the level
of his physical, mental and social efficiency"), individualized habilitation
plans, humane physical and psychological environment (including dignity,
privacy, and humane care), and sufficient qualified staff to provide ade-
quate habilitation. The court declared that neither failure to comply with
the decree nor default could be justified by lack or unavailability of oper-
ating funds, staff, or facilities.
Id. 23-24.
4 6 See Hoffman & Dunn, Beyond Rouse and Wyatt: An Administrative-Law
Model for Expanding and Implementing the Mental Patient's Right to Treatment,
61 VA. L. Rav. 297, 304-05 (1975).
46 See Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1313 (5th Cir. 1974) (testimony of
Dr. Gunnar Dybwad).
47 According to the statistics of the Alabama Department of Mental Health, in
fiscal year 1971-72 the department had a $36.6 million budget; in fiscal year
19718]
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mental hospitals, the state has greatly reduced the number of in-
patients. In 1969, there were 5,275 patients at Bryce; by 1975 there
were less than 2,000.48 This reduction is partly due to Lynch v.
Baxley 49 which supplemented Wyatt by setting stringent criteria
for involuntary commitment at the point of admission and by re-
quiring periodic review of all patients. In effect, Wyatt and Lynch
mark the end of an era of state warehousing of the mentally ill in
Alabama.
As dramatic as the changes wrought by Wyatt are at the state
level, its impact is not limited to Alabama. The decree has attracted
the attention of legal commentators and serves as a precedent in
the developing field of mental health law.50 Wyatt has been identi-
fied as "the most extensive action to date in defining and enforcing
the constitutional right of civilly committed mental patients to
receive adequate treatment." 51 Bruce Ennis, chief counsel in Wyatt,
commented on its potential impact:
Those standards, if allowed in other states would cause a
revolution in institutional health-care services .... In order
to meet the standards, states would be forced to discharge
vast numbers of inappropriately hospitalized patients.
Those who remained would live in a normally furnished
home-like environment, retaining all the rights of privacy,
communication, and human dignity enjoyed by other citi-
zens. And they would be given individualized programs of
1972-73, the budget jumped to $49.5 million; in fiscal year 1973-74, the budget
was $63.6 million; the projected 1975-76 budget was nearly $90 million. T. Zander,
The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on Alabama 17 (Sept. 2, 1975) (unpublished
paper prepared for Public Interest Law Project, University of Wisconsin, copy on
file, University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
48 Id. 8. These reductions are in part a direct response to the Wyatt order,
which called for discharge or transfer of inappropriate patients, and, in part, an
indirect response; the right to treatment was so expensive that large numbers of
patients were undoubtedly discharged for financial reasons.
49386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974). In Lynch Alabama's civil commitment
laws were held unconstitutional by a three judge federal court. The court held
that the state must prove in a probate court hearing, at which the subject is present
and represented by counsel, not only that he is mentally ill, but that he also poses:
a real and present threat of harm to himself or to others, that this danger has been
evidenced by a recent overt act, that treatment is available, and that the proposed
commitment is the least restrictive alternative necessary and available for the
treatment of his illness. Id. 391-92.
50 See, e.g., Woe v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part and remanded
in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686
(W.D. Ill. 1973).
51 Comment, supra note 35, at 1282.
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treatment, job training and assistance designed to return
them quickly to their communities. 2
As Ennis' statement suggests, the public interest attorneys who
litigated Wyatt sought not only the improvement of conditions in
Bryce, Partlow, and Searcy but also implementation of the principle
of deinstitutionalization.53 Evidence presented at trial went beyond
documenting the horrible conditions in the state institutions to
demonstrate the detrimental effects of institutionalization in general.
Social science research was cited to show the significant improve-
ments experienced by mentally ill patients participating in model
community health programs in contrast to the continuous deteriora-
tion ("institutionalism") of committed patients.5 4 Influenced per-
haps by this information, Judge Johnson ruled that a right to treat-
ment in the least restrictive setting that can achieve the purposes of
the commitment is a necessary component of the constitutional right
to treatment enjoyed by involuntarily committed mental patients. 5
Since Wyatt the constitutional right to treatment of the civilly
committed mentally ill and mentally retarded has been affirmed in
a variety of contexts 6 Many of these opinions have relied approv-
ingly on Judge Johnson's constitutional reasoning. In O'Connor v.
52B. ErN, s, Pl so-Tns or PSYCHIATRY 107-08 (1972).
53 For a discussion of the two major positions of mental health reformers-the
"civil liberties" approach and the "treatment" approach-see Klein, Mental Health
Law: Legal Doctrine at the Crossroads, Mental Health Law Project Newsletter,
March, 1976, at 7. The treatment approach would civilly commit those who are
mentally ill and need treatment but do not seek it, if treatment is available. On
the other hand, the civil liberties approach has been a disguised attempt to abolish
all treatment by imposing strict procedural requirements. See Scott, Another Look
at the Crossroads, Mental Health Law Project Newsletter, June, 1976, at 7. See
generally Rothman, supra note 19, at 21.
54 Marked and sustained improvements in mental condition have been made
among participants in carefully organized and adequately staffed community experi-
ments. Equally well-documented is the fact that the lack of support and structure,
particularly in the initial period of adjustment from hospital to community, has
severe regressive effects on many within these populations. Unfortunately this side
effect of community "treatment" was not as carefully disseminated to the courts by
the Mental Health bar as the more optimistic community success stories. Rather
than mass release, an alternative argument could have been advanced. Wolpert &
Wolpert, The Relocation of Released Mental Hospital Patients Into Residential
Communities, 7 Poify Scr. 31, 39 (1976) ("If the state hospital environment is
antitherapeutic (i.e. it inflicts harm) for diverse categories of its in-patients then
the minimum criteria for discharge should be the absence of an antitherapeutic
environment in the subsequent placement." Id.).
55 344 F. Supp. at 379.
56 See, e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Welsch
v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part and remanded in part,
550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D.
Ill. 1973).
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Donaldson',7 however, the Supreme Court considered the case of
a man who had been confined in a mental institution for almost
fifteen years without receiving treatment. In a unanimous opinion
the Court sidestepped the constitutional issue of a right to treat-
ment; nevertheless it found a constitutional right to liberty appli-
cable, holding that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely
in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family members or friends." 58 An important question left un-
answered by the Court, of course, is whether treatment would con-
stitute a constitutionally sufficient "more."'
III. THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
A. Application to Mental Hospitals
Application of a least restrictive alternative analysis to the
treatment rights of involuntarily committed mental patients evolved
in the development of the right to treatment. At first the right to
treatment in the least restrictive setting was recognized as a statutory
right. 9 Later it was set forth as a necessary component of the right
to treatment and thus a constitutional right of involuntarily com-
mitted patients.6 0 When a least restrictive alternative requirement
is imposed, the state's purposes in committing an individual need
not be frustrated. One viewpoint suggests that in the context of
institutionalization
[t]he principle of the least restrictive alternative is a most
limited and modest incursion on a state's interest. It does
not prevent the state from achieving any of the objectives
it seeks through commitment, but merely asks courts to
ensure that the state imposes no greater constriction of free-
dom than necessary to serve the objectives.61
57422 U.S. 563 (1975).
58 Id. 576.
59 See, e.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v.
Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
60 See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974), affyd in
part and remanded in part, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, decision reserved in part sub -nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974).
61 Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 Mict. L. REv. 1107, 1111 (1972) (foot-
notes omitted).
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Within the context of the mental institution, less restrictive
alternative analysis requires transferring patients who can function
in relative autonomy from highly controlled wards to more normal
environments. Logically extended, the principle requires trans-
ferring some patients out of the hospital itself and into institutions
such as nursing homes where they would have even greater inde-
pendence. The transfer of involuntarily committed mental patients
from state hospitals to seemingly less restrictive institutions has not
been without problems, however. The danger inherent in such a
large scale operation was perceived in the course of the right to
treatment movement:
Much of the analysis of this Note suggests the desira-
bility of the creation of less restrictive treatment alterna-
tives, and the need for drastic changes in mental institu-
tions if they are to be brought into conformity with
constitutional requirements. This analysis, however, should
not be used as an excuse for dismantling large hospitals
without a concomitant effort to establish adequate out-
patient clinics and aftercare facilities.
G2
Ignoring such warnings, many states began to release patients
into the community with little regard for the patients' needs for
further psychiatric help. 3 Aged mental patients who were not
sufficiently competent for full release were often transferred to
nursing homes. Thus the elderly were "dumped" from one institu-
tion into another, despite the dangers of such relocations 64 and the
possibilities of neglect and regression in a new setting. Although
the phenomenon of dumping predated the first right to treatment
decisions, it was certainly accelerated by such decisions. An exami-
nation of the aftermath of Wyatt v. Stickney provides a striking
example.
62 Developments in the Lau--Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HAMv.
L. REv. 1190, 1405 (1974) (emphasis supplied).
63 Following the Joint Commission's report on mental health in 1961, jomnr
Co.Nm'N oN MENrAL ILizmss AND HEATH, AcTiox Foa M=NAL HEaTH (1961),
the Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) movement seemed to hold great
promise for the treatment of mental illness. Despite the rhetoric, the centers failed
to materialize. Only 443 of the planned 2,500 CMHCs were established. NURSIc
Homs AND MErAL PATENTS, supra note 1, at 703-04. These were poorly
financed and poorly distributed. There is evidence that the CMHCs have not served
the most seriously impaired populations.
04 One of the few conclusively documented facts in gerontological literature is
the danger of extra-institutional movement of impaired persons. See Aldrich &
Mendkoff, Relocation of the Aged and Disabled: A Mortality Study, 11 J. Am.
GmIATmcS Soc'y 185 (1963); Lieberman, Relocation Research and Social Policy,
14 GEno-rNoLois-r 494 (1974). Lieberman, who has conducted the most method-
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B. The Consequences of Wyatt v. Stickney
Following the Wyatt decision, large numbers of mental patients
were relocated directly from state mental institutions to nursing
homes in Alabama.6 5 From 1973 through June, 1975, 700 Bryce
patients were transferred directly to private nursing homes. 66 Even
greater numbers of ex-mental patients were admitted to nursing
homes following short stays in the community, suggesting perhaps
that the state's original decision for unconditional release was pre-
mature or ill-advised. In 1975 over 4,000 ex-mental patients financed
by Medicaid resided in nursing homes in Alabama.67
The rapid discharge of large numbers of patients was accom-
plished only by substituting federal funds for former state fiscal
responsibility.68 The Medicare/Medicaid provisions of the Social
Security Act 69 provided families with a convenient alternative to
state institutionalization of their older, senile members. These pro-
visions further assisted the state in transferring out long-term
ologically sophisticated studies in this area, summarized his years of research on
transferred institutionalized populations as follows: "No matter what the condition
of the individual, the nature of the environment, or the degree of sophisticated
preparation, relocation entails a higher than acceptable risk to the large majority
of those being moved." Id. 495.
For a list of diseases related to separation from a familiar environment, see
D. BAXAN, DisE~s, PAn AND SACRICE: TOWARD A PSYCHrOLOGY OF SUFFERING
(1968). Separation and estrangement have been linked to such diseases as asthma,
cancer, congestive heart failure, diabetes, arthritis, and tuberculosis. Id. 7-8.
Movement is particularly hard on the aged. The most vulnerable are those with
chronic brain syndrome or senility. Blenker, Environmental Change and the Aging
Individual, 7 GEnONTOLoGxsT 101, 103 (1967). Also substantially documented in
gerontological research is the variability in degree of the adverse effects of reloca-
tion according to the level of preparation for the movement. Gottesman's findings
from a study of geriatric mental patients moved to nursing homes reports that
among a group of patients moved without preparation, the death rate was twice
that of a control group receiving extensive relocation preparation. Gottesman, The
Mental Hospital's Role in Developing Programs for Geriatric Patients, in Zusman &
Bertsch, supra note 1, at 195.
65 The Alabama example is used for its relevance to Wyatt, but it is not a
single state or single generation phenomenon. The route of the Alabama ex-mental
patient is one followed by tens of thousands of ex-mental patients across the nation.
See B. STOTSKY, supra note 17; Kahn, supra note 1; Redick, supra note 17;
F. Redlich & S. Kellert, supra note 5.
66 T. Zander, supra note 47, at 13.
67 Interview with Joe Fassio, Director of Long-Term Care Medical Services
Administration of Alabama, in Montgomery, Alabama (Aug. 4, 1975).
68 The federal government assumes 50-83% of the cost of Medicaid programs,
depending on average per capita income of the residents of the state. INrno-
nuCTOrY REPORT, supra note 8, at 39.
6042 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (1970).
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chronic patients and younger, mentally ill, nondangerous patients
without families who under new rulings could no longer be held
involuntarily in mental hospitals.70 As "indigent" these mental
patients could qualify for welfare and/or welfare health care. Con-
sequently, responsibility for many psychotic and/or elderly persons
has been shifted from state mental hospitals to the federal welfare
system, thereby enabling large numbers of ex-mental patients, now
Medicaid recipients, to reside in nursing homes.
71
The movement to the nursing home from Bryce and the other
state mental hospitals covered in Wyatt has been a complex process
-at times direct, other times, more circuitous. Since Wyatt Bryce
has been an institution in chaos, experiencing numerous turnovers
in staff and administrators, and modification of discharge procedures
to comply with Lynch.72 In the effort to reorganize Bryce in order
to comply with Wyatt, numerous "inappropriate" admissions (geri-
atric and mentally retarded patients) and nondangerous mentally ill
patients were discharged. The patient population was reviewed, and
candidates for discharge were determined. The Human Rights Com-
mittee established by Judge Johnson 73 often participated in this
process. Relocation was easiest for those patients who had been
inappropriately committed and had families. They were simply
returned to their families. Many soon ended up in private nurs-
ing homes.
For those individuals who had grown old in Bryce, and for
other socially marginal patients without family ties, alternative
"community" placements had to be made. The largest portion of
this category entered private nursing homes that were willing to
accept mental patients. For competent patients, the transfer was
effected by an administrative decision made by the hospital. Al-
though a hearing was sometimes conducted, and the patient gen-
70 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
71 Other ex-mental patients reside in the community. Most are welfare re-
cipients in either low income areas of cities or in federally subsidized sheltered
environments such as halfway houses and foster homes. See Leaf, Wyatt v.
Stickney: Assessing the Impact in Alabama, 28 Hosp. & ComroUNrr Psych. 351
(1977). Many of the arguments of this Article would apply to the use of foster
homes, boarding homes, and halfway houses in the care of psychotics, but they
are beyond the scope of this Article.
72 Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974). For a discussion of
Lynch, see text accompanying note 49 supra.
73 See Wyatt v. Stiekney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 378, 344 F. Supp. 387, 394 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in part, decision reserved in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
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erally was asked his or her preference,, no on-site visits were con-
ducted to enable the patient to give informed consent to the transfer.
In the case of incompetent, geriatric, and mentally retarded patients,
the process was even less rigorous. They were simply moved out
when an empty nursing home bed became available. 74
The mental patients who were moved to nursing homes under-
went a provisionary period to see if they "adjusted." If the nursing
home did not request that a patient be returned to the mental
hospital, the individual was deemed to have adjusted. After the
provisionary period, 75 they were considered to be placed in a non-
institutional setting within the community. As such, they remained
a responsibility of Non-Institutional Care and Services (NICS) De-
partment of Bryce. The hospital maintains a staff of field workers
to assist them. Staff members visit each-nursing home where mental
patients reside on a monthly basis to monitor their conditions and
to attend to administrative problems. The hospital also retains fiscal
responsibility for patients placed directly by NICS, including pay-
ment of burial expenses and portions of the nursing home bill not
covered by Medicaid.76 In this sense, the hospital maintains a con-
tinuous responsibility for former patients now residing in nursing
homes. In 1976, Bryce maintained responsibility for over 535 such
nursing home patients.
7 7
C. Nursing Homes as Less Restrictive Alternatives
The transfer of mental patients to nursing homes to comply with
the least restrictive alternative component of the constitutional right
to treatment passes constitutional muster, of course, only to the
74 It was not unusual in the author's survey to find these patients in nursing
homes unaware of where they were or thinkdng they were still at Bryce or the "old
crazy house." See text accompanying notes 91 & 92 infra.
75 Prior to Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), all nursing
home placements were on a six-month provisionary basis, after which time patients
were either returned to Bryce or "discharged" to the nursing home. After Lynck
most patients were sent to nursing homes on a two week temporary visit and thea
discharged to the nursing home, although some were maintained in the provisionary
status for six months. T. Waters, Accountability in Transitional Services: A Cau-
tionary Note (1976) (mimeograph, presented at Non-Institutional Care Conference,
Tuscaloosa, Ala.; copy on file, University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
TO The Department of Mental Health will provide full payment for private
nursing home care if the mental patient is not eligible for Medicaid. ArA. CoDE
tit. 22, §320(5) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
7 T. Waters, supra note 75, at 6. Bryce transferred five patients to nursing
homes for every two placed in other personal health care facilities. Id.
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degree that nursing homes are in fact less restrictive alternatives. 7
For many patients, however, nursing home residency, which is often
involuntarily undertaken and typically permanent, is often a more
drastic and deprived environment than mental hospitalization." In
the post-right to treatment mental health system, at least, patients
receive a minimum level of treatment, rehabilitation services, peri-
odic review of confinement, and discharge. These factors are often
missing in nursing home residency.
1. General Research Findings
The available evidence suggests that nationally most nursing
homes offer little or no treatment, and that staffing is so minimal
that even custodial nursing care is not generally available. Reports
by the Subcommittee on Long Term Care of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging and by a Nader study group document that
in most nursing homes even the bottom line of treatment-humane
and compassionate care-is absent.8 0  The Senate Subcommittee's
Investigations on long term care in America note that
millions of older Americans who have already received care
in nursing homes have not received maximum help. In
many cases they have not even received humane treatment.
And in an alarming number of known cases, they have
actually encountered abuse and physical danger, including
unsanitary conditions, fire hazards, poor or unwholesome
food, infections, adverse drug reactions, overtranquilization,
and frequent medication errors. In addition, they have
been exposed to negligence on the part of nursing home
personnel. The net impact is that far too many patients
have needlessly sustained injury, and, in some cases, death.8'
78 See Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Prac-
tical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 IhcH. L. REv. 1107 (1972);
Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 1964 UTAH L.
REv. 254.
79 See text accompanying notes 93-103 infra. For a graphic description of
the conditions that may await residents in certain room and board facilities, see
the case history of Bill Dixon as related by his social worker in Nunssno HoMEs
AND MENTAL PATIENTS, supra note 1, at 714-15. Mr. Dixon was the plaintiff in
Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
80 See LvroDucTony REP ORT, supra note 8; C. TowNsND, OLD AGE: T=.
LAsT SEGREGATION, Tins NADER REPORT (1971).
81 ImoDucToRY RxPORT, supra note 8, at 1-2. For an inventory of the
deficiencies which plague nursing homes, see Brown, An Appraisal of the Nursing
Home Enforcement Process, 17 Amz. L. REv. 304, 311-13 (1975).
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One government survey of ninety nursing homes in four states
found that over fifty percent of the nursing homes surveyed had
serious deficiencies, even though they were receiving full Medicaid
reimbursements.
8 2
Certain life threatening conditions, including drug mismanage-
ment,8 3 sedation and restraints,84 fire hazards,8 5 and the absence of
physicians and skilled nursing personnel 8 6 are endemic to nursing
8 2 INTRoDUcToRy REPORT, supra note 8, at 3 n.18. Of the 90 homes surveyed,
48 lacked adequate nursing staff, 47 lacked adequate physician visits, and 44 violated
fire safety standards.
83 Government studies of drug administration in nursing homes have found
alarming misuse of drugs, including overmedication, sedation for staff convenience,
high rates of errors, high rates of drug addiction, and adverse drug reactions among
many patients. Studies have found that the average nursing home resident takes
from four to seven different medications each day. INToDucrory REPORT, supra
note 8, at 7. Nearly 20% of the medications administered are tranquilizing drugs.
STAFF or SUBcOMm. ON LONG-TERm CA"E OF SENATE SPECIAL Commlx. ON AGING,
94TH CONG., IsT SESS., NURSING Hozum CAns IN Tim UNE=D STATEs: FAnuE IN
PuBuc PoLicy, DRUGS IN NURsING Ho.mEs: MisusE, H-IGH CosTs, AN KtCCnACxs
(Supporting Paper No. 2), at x (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as DRues].
The most common method of prescribing is by phone. Id. 248. Drug administra-
tion is generally left to poorly trained aides and orderlies. Id. 249. Consequently,
the error rate for medications administered in nursing homes is between 20-50%.
Id. 252.
84 One of the most offensive nursing home practices is the overuse of tran-
quilizers to keep patients quiet and out of the way. See DRUGS, supra note 83, at
268. In addition to violating an individual's freedom, most tranquilizers create
dangerous side effects including a predisposition to accidents, apathy, confusion,
drooling, and difficulty in swallowing. Other side effects (specific to certain drugs)
include akathisa, buccolingual dyskinesia, dystonia, pseudo parkinsonism, and at
times, in interaction with other illnesses, death. Id. 273.
85 Nursing homes, according to national statistics, are a highly dangerous en-
vironment with regard to fires. In 1973, 6,400 nursing home fires resulted in the
death of 551 persons. STAFF or SuBcomnmr. ON LoNG-TEiRm CARE OF THE SENATE
SPECIAL Comnm. ON AGING, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., NURSING HomrE CAnE IN TrE
UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN Ponmrc PoLICY, TnE CONTINUING CrmomcrE OF
NURsING Hormm Fres (Supporting Paper No. 5), at xiii (Comm. Print 1975).
A General Accounting Office study indicated that 72% of American nursing homes
have one or more major fire hazards. See generally INTMOnuc~roa REPORT, supra
note 8, at 9.
86 Nursing home residents represent perhaps the most needy segment of the
population from a health care perspective (with the possible exception of certain
hospital emergencies), yet medical doctors are not to be found on the premises.
Their absence explains in large part the poor quality of medical care available in
nursing homes.
[T]he doctor's absence results in poor medical care. In other words, phy-
sicians fail to evaluate patients, fail to monitor therapy, and sometimes
fail to diagnose new ailments which occur subsequent to the patient's entry
into the nursing home. Many patients go for months without a doctor's
attention, and in many homes no one has overall responsibility for the
medical care provided throughout the home.
STAFF or SuBcomm. ON LONG-TERM CARE OF TE SENATE SPECIAL Comme. oNT
AGING, 9 4 TH CONG., 1ST SESS., NURSING Housm CARE IN THE UNITED STATES:
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homes. Moreover, these abuses are intensified by the lack of per-
sonnel and trained staff. Congressional inquiry has revealed that
these problems are widespread:
[S]ubcommittee transcripts are replete with examples of
cruelty, negligence, danger from fires, food poisoning,
virulent infections, lack of human dignity, callousness and
unnecessary regimentation, and kickbacks to nursing home
operators from suppliers.
Estimates on the number of substandard nursing homes
in the United States vary widely, but the overwhelming
evidence indicates that a majority of the nursing homes
fail to meet standards of acceptability.8 7
Numerous studies of the adjustment of ex-mental patients in
nursing homes report cases of individuals who regressed following
nursing home placement, often due to lack of activity, isolation,
separation from familiar environments, and transplantation shock.Ss
In a study of former state mental patients in Boston who were trans-
ferred to Massachusetts nursing homes, Bernard Stotsky found that
nurses frequently do not try to keep former mental patients physi-
cally or mentally active.8 9 Often prodomal symptoms of physical
or mental illness are attributed to old age. Sometimes people who
were ambulatory and active at the mental hospital become with-
drawn and passive in the nursing home. As Stotsky notes: "Grant-
ing the vital importance of preventing nursing homes from becoming
little state hospitals, it is alarming to observe good adjustment in
nursing homes frequently defined in terms of withdrawn, apathetic,
uncomplaining and depressed behavior, the great virtue of which
being that it is not obnoxious to nurses or administrators." 0
FAILU Nf Pmliuc PoLicy, Docrons LN NuRsiNG Holms: Tme SisU.TNED RESPOx-
smrrv (Supporting Paper No. 3) 331 (Comm. Print 1975).
Although there is a legal requirement that each resident be visited every 30
days, a recent GAO survey revealed that 52% of the doctors visited nursing home
residents at intervals from 35 to 210 days apart. Regan, Quality Assurance Systems
in Nursing Homes, 53 J. UnBAN L. 153, 168 (1975).
87 INTRODUCTORY REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.
88 See B. STOYSKY, supra note 17; Erickson, Outcome Studies in Mental Hospi-
tals: A Review, 82 PsYcH. BULL. 519 (1975); Gottesman, supra note 64; Lamb &
Goertzel, Discharged Mental Patients-Are They Really in the Community?, 24
AacmvEs GEN. PsycHr. 29 (1971); Reich & Siegel, The Chronically Mentally Ill:
Shuffle to Oblivion, 1973 Psycir. A-NALS 35 (1973).
89 B. STOTSKY, supra note 17, at 29.
90 Id. 66-67.
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2. A Case Study of Alabama
The deficient conditions of nursing homes with respect to the
treatment of the mentally ill generally were confirmed by a study
of nursing homes in Alabama conducted by the author.91 Ironi-
cally many of the residents of these nursing homes are former Bryce
patients whose presence in the homes is directly attributable to
Wyatt. In view of the author's findings of a substantial level of
mental and/or emotional impairment 92 among these relocated
patients, it is useful to compare the treatment and support resources
available in nursing homes with those available in Bryce, both be-
fore and after Wyatt.
A comparison of the medical treatment and support resources
currently available at Bryce Hospital with that available in a
random sample of Alabama nursing homes is presented in Tables
I and II. Most striking is the almost total absence of physician
care in the nursing homes. Although the mental hospital popu-
lation is much younger and physically healthier than that of the
nursing homes, the mental hospital employs approximately ten
times as many doctors as the nursing homes. In fact, the nursing
homes on the average employ only one doctor for every 1050 pa-
tients.9 3 Furthermore, nursing homes in the study employed no
technical or educational personnel, and provided virtually no thera-
peutic or rehabilitative programs. In short, the data clearly reveal
that nursing homes provide merely custodial care.
91 The author wishes to thank the following for their assistance in providing
the data needed for the study: Bryce State Mental Hospital, particularly Dr.
Harold W. Heller, Superintendent, and Tom H. Waters, Director of Non-
Institutional Care and Services; and the Alabama Medical Services Administration.
92 These findings are based on a preliminary analysis of the author's Ph.D.
dissertation data on the level of a stratified functioning of a random sample of
Alabama's nursing home residents, including former mental patients. Nursing home
residents were screened for chronic brain syndrome, psychiatric symptoms as reported
by residents and staff, medical diagnosis of mental illness, and a global assessment
of emotional and mental impairment.
93 The figure on physicians employed by nursing homes does not include pri-
vate physician visits made to clients residing in nursing homes. In case of serious
medical conditions, residents of nursing homes, like inmates of mental hospitals,
would be transferred to a general hospital.
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF MEDICAL TREATMENT RESOURCES
AT BRYCE HOSPITAL
AND AT
14 ALABAMA NURSING HOMES (1975)
CLASSIFICATION BRYCE NURSING HOMES
Staff/ Staff/
patient n = 14 patient
No. of ratio No. of ratio
full-time (patient full-time (patient
equivalent 94 census = equivalent census =
employees 1,741) employees 1,113)
1. Doctors
a. M.D.s (non-Psychiatrist) 15 1/116 1.06 1/1050
b. Psychiatrists 8 1/218 -0- 0/1113
c. Psychologists 56 1/31 -0- 0/1113
d. Dentists 4 1/435 -0- 0/1113
2. Registered Nurses 38 1/46 28.35 1/39
3. Practical Nurses &
Auxiliary Nursing
Personnel
a. LPNs 29 1/60 97.8 1/11
b. Nurses aides 807 1/2 348.6 1/3.2
c. Orderlies 162 1/11 36.4 1/31
d. Auxiliary personnel -0- 0/1741 1.0 1/1113
e. Volunteers -0- 0/1741 6.7 1/166
TOTAL 998 1/1.7 519.91 1/2.14
4. Technical Personnel
a. Medical technologists 9 1/193 -0- 0/1113
b. Medical record librarians -0-- 0/1741 1.3 1/856
c. Medical record technicians 4 1/435 .175 1/6360
d. Other medical record
personnel 180 1/10 1.12 1/994
e. Pharmacists (R.ph.) 2 1/871 2.26 1/492
f. Pharmacy technician 5 1/348 -0- 0/1113
g. Dental assistant 3 1/580 -0- 0/1113
h. Dental hygienist 4 1/435 -0- 0/1113
94 Employee figures are based on full-time equivalent employees on a 40 hour
week, rather than total number of employees, due to the frequent use of pait-time
employees by nursing homes.
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF SOCIAL SUPPORT RESOURCES
AT BRYCE HOSPITAL
AND AT
14 ALABAMA NURSING HOMES (1975)
CATEGORY
1. Therapy and Rehabilitation
a. Occupational
therapist
b. Physical therapist
c. Physical therapist aide
d. Rehabilitation counselor
e. Speech therapist
2. Social Work and Activities
2. Social worker (MSW)
b. Social worker
(without MSW)
c. Activity director
d. Recreational/activity
personnel
e. Psychologist asst.
3. Discharge Placement
a. Placement worker
b. Field representative
c. Field representative asst.
4. Education and Religion
a. Director of pastoral
care 8c education
b. Institution school teacher
c. Retarded children teacher
d. Chaplain
5. Personal Services
a. Barber
b. Beautician
c. Canteen clerk
d. Seamstress
BRYCE
No. of
full-time
equivalent
employees
NURSING HOMES
No. of
full-time
equivalent
employees
1
-0-
-0-
9
-0-
.025
.10
1.025
-0-
-0-
.325
2.75
11.83
.25
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
6. Safety 8c Security
a. Security officers 15
b. Fire inspector 1
c. Environmental consultant 1
7. Advocates 5
Significantly, the treatment received by mentally ill
Alabama nursing homes is inferior to that available
mental hospitals prior to Wyatt.95
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
residents in
in Alabama
95 The pre-Wyatt treatment staff at Bryce consisted of 17 psychiatrists, 850
psychiatric aides, 21 registered nurses, 12 patient activity workers, 12 psychologists,
15 social workers (2 with M.S.W.'s), 1 clinical psychologist, and 3 medical prac-
titioners-more than the comparable figures for post-Wyatt nursing homes. See
325 F.2d at 783.
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Although nursing care, the apparent raison d'etre of nursing
homes, is more nearly equal in the two institutional settings, Ala-
bama nursing homes nonetheless compare unfavorably with the
state mental hospital. Although nursing homes have a slightly
higher registered nurse to patient ratio (one to thirty-nine) than
Bryce (one to forty-six), nursing personnel in nursing homes are
more likely than their counterparts in mental hospitals to be utilized
in administrative capacities. Furthermore, the lack of an adequate
number of physicians in the nursing homes makes it more difficult
for a nurse to bring a matter to a doctor's attention expeditiously.
The availability of psychiatric care is even worse. Even though
substantial numbers of nursing home residents in general, and
former Bryce patients in particular, are depressed and suffer from
chronic brain syndrome and/or active psychoses, 6 the nursing
homes in the sample offer no psychiatric services and only minimal
social supports. No psychiatrists, no psychologists, and no psycho-
logical aides are employed by the nursing homes surveyed. This gap
in service is not alleviated by the meager social support staff. The
lack of an adequate staff creates feelings of social isolation among
the nursing home residents. Seventy-five percent of those surveyed
do not know any aide by name; forty-six percent cannot summon a
nurse by name; almost half of the residents report that the nursing
staff does nothing for them. Former mental patients are the most
isolated residents of nursing homes.
This empirical data suggests that, given the present level of
resources in Alabama nursing homes, the medical and psychosocial
needs of mentally impaired nursing home residents are largely
unmet. In contrast to the nursing homes, Bryce has abundant re-
sources. Therefore, nursing homes in Alabama cannot be said to
offer a less drastic alternative for mentally ill persons than institu-
tionalization in mental hospitals. Rather, there is virtually no treat-
ment available for those mental patients transferred by the state
mental health department to nursing homes. Furthermore, dis-
charge from nursing homes is rare for former Bryce patients. The
cruel irony is that Wyatt, which was meant to guarantee the right
to treatment for Bryce's involuntarily committed patients, has re-
sulted in a substantially lower level of care for those patients who
90 One study estimates that 80% of long-term nursing home residents are men-
tally impaired. Goldfarb, Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorder in IMetropolitan Old
Age and Nursing Homes, 10 J. Am. Gmu~nmc Soc'r 77 (1962).
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were moved to nursing homes to avoid the expenditures compelled
by Wyatt.9
7
The situation of mental patients in Alabama nursing homes is
not atypical. Independent investigators in Illinois,98 Michigan,99
Colorado,100 Arizona,01 and New York 102 have discovered similar
conditions. Reviewing the national situation, the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Long Term Care found that in terms of life-threatening
conditions, the probability of discharge, and the extent of rights
forfeited, placement of the mentally ill in nursing homes is often
less desirable than placement in mental hospitals.103 One way to
attack that problem would be to guarantee to mentally ill nursing
home residents in general, and to former mental patients in par-
ticular, a right to treatment. A discussion of that right at present
and of a framework for its constitutional extension in certain cases
follows.
IV. EXTENDING THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT TO
NURSING HOME RESIDENTS
A. Statutory and Contractual Rights
1. Federal Regulation
Large numbers of nursing home residents are Medicaid recipi-
ents.104 Federal regulations require a minimum level of care for
and the protection of certain civil rights of Medicaid/Medicare
recipients residing in nursing homes. 10 5 The rights of these resi-
dents include: a) freedom from restraints "except as authorized in
97Undoubtedly nursing home life has certain advantages over institutionaliza-
tion in mental hospitals. Nursing homes are generally smaller in size, closer to the
commun;ity of origin, and less stigmatizing for the resident. Although the living
conditions in nursing homes may be better than in mental hospitals, the quality of
treatment in these homes remains poor.
98 NtnSING HOMES AND MENTAL PATIENTS, supra note 1, at 759-60.
99 Gottesman, supra note 64, at 192.
100 Jones, Community Care for Chronic Mental Patients: The Need for Re-
assessment, 26 Hosp. AND CoMM N ITY PsycH. 94, 96 (1975).
101 M. House, Pima County Nursing Homes: A Less Drastic Means? 37 (un-
published paper on file with Arizona Law Review; copy on file, University of
Pennsylvania Law Review).
102 Reich & Siegel, supra note 88.
103 NunsmIG Hovms AND M rAL PATIENTs, supra note 1, at 704.
104 In 1972, 562,330 nursing home residents were Medicaid beneficiaries.
I-4TBODucTORY REPoRT, supra note 8, at 161, and an estimated 70,000 were Medi-
care recipients at any given time. Id. 159. See Brown, supra note 81, at 307.
105 Statutes regulating nursing homes participating in the Medicare program
are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395x(j)(7), (k) (1970), with accompanying H.E.Wv.
regulations at 20 C.F.R. 405.604, 405.1120-.1137, 405.1901-1908, and 405.1911
(1977).
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writing by a physician... or when necessary to protect the patient
from injury to himself or to others," 101 b) full information about
and participation in medical treatment "unless medically contra-
indicated," 107 c) freedom from reprisal for voicing complaints, 08
d) protection from forced labor, 09 e) management of personal
finances or a quarterly accounting of all financial transactions, 1 0 and
privacy, consideration, and respect for personal dignity."1 There
are also rights to certain services which have been summarized as
follows:
The federal regulations for [Skilled Nursing Facilities
(SNFs)] include the requirement of nursing services (in-
cluding a registered nurse on duty seven days a week),
and rehabilitative services, dietetic services, pharmaceutical
services, laboratory and radiologic services, dental services,
social services, and patient activities.
For [Intermediate Care Facilities (ICFs)], the federal
regulations require the staff to be sufficiently large to dis-
charge all necessary duties, supervision of nursing services
by an RN or an LPN who consults with an RN at least 4
hours weekly, an activities program, social services, physical
services, and other services which parallel the requirements
for SNFs.1
22
Additionally, residents must see a physician every sixty days," 3 their
medical and psychosocial needs must be met,1 4 and their best inter-
ests must be protected.1 5
10620 C.F.R. §405.1121(7) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §249.12(a)(1)(ii)(B)(7)
(1976).
10720 C.F.R. §405.1121(k)(3) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §249.12(a)(1)(ii)(B)(3)
(1976). The right to refuse treatment is not recognized. Gassel, Nursing Home
Law, in LAw op Tus EI=ry 204-05 (J. Weiss ed. 1977).
10820 C.F.R. § 405.1121(k)(5) (1977); 45 C.F.R. § 249.12(a)(1)(ii)(B)(5)
(1976). No grievance mechanism or outside enforcement agency is provided,
however.
10920 C.F.R. §405.1121(k)(6) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §249.12(a)(1)(ii)(B)
(11) (1976).
11020 C.F.R. §405.1121(k)(6) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 249.12(a)(1)(ii)(B)(6)
(1976).
11120 C.F.R. §405.1121(k)(10) (1976); 45 C.F.R. §249.12(a)(1)(ii)(B)
(10) (1976).
112 Gassel, supra note 107, at 208 (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of
the differences between SNFs and ICFs, see Brown, supra note 81, at 306.
"1320 C.F.R. §405.1123(b) (1977); 45 C.F.R. §249.12(b)(4)(iv)(6)
(1976).
114 20 C.F.R. § 405.1121(1) (1) (1977).
115 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (19) (1970).
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Two major problems exist in defining treatment rights under
the current Medicaid/Medicare regulations. Most standards are
vague, and for almost every regulation there is an exception, making
it extremely difficult to determine the level of compliance and any
resulting liability. Furthermore, the lack of comprehensiveness fails
to ensure that an adequate minimum level of medical care will be
provided."" These problems are manifested in the inspection
process. Inspection to insure compliance with the federal regula-
tions is left to the states. The usual inspection method is an annual
on-site visit, with follow-up inspections to insure that deficiencies
have been corrected. In an excellent study of the nursing home
enforcement process, Robert Brown noted the weaknesses of this
inspection system:
Although this process results in the correction of some
violations, many serious violations are not detected. Fur-
ther, information as to deficiencies found during inspec-
tions is not widely distributed; thus the public remains
ignorant of which facilities contain deficiencies and which
do not.
Another problem is that inspections usually are under-
taken only for the purpose of annual certification, rather
than for the purpose of investigating complaints. ... 7
2. State Regulation
in addition to federal standards under the Social Security Act,
each nursing home must meet building safety standards (Life Safety
Code) 118 and state licensing regulations. The licensing pattern
116 Brown, supra note 81, at 316-17.
.17 Id. 325-26. Philip Gassel reached similar conclusions about the inspection
process:
The nursing home inspection process is generally not effective. De-
ficiencies are not detected or not reported during the inspection or are
ignored when the facility seeks certification. Inspection agencies are often
understaffed. Inspectors may be bribed or be reluctant to find a nursing
home not in compliance out of concern for the consequences to the home.
Inspections generally are announced in advance, allowing the facility to
bring in additional personnel or improve conditions on the inspection date.
Gassel, supra note 107, at 210.
11s The [Life Safety Code], developed by the National Fire Protection
Association, contains requirements affecting the physical structure of a
facility. These standards, applicable to all institutions, not just to nursing
homes, are designed to minimize the risk of fire, a considerable hazard in
nursing homes. The code's requirements govern fire alarm systems,
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generally entails the granting of a license for a specific time period
by an authorized state agency, usually the state board of health, upon
a showing that the home meets certain preconditions established by
the agency. State legislation pertaining to nursing homes falls into
one of three broad categories:
1) licensing procedures for nursing home administrators,
usually regulated by a Nursing Home Administration Board;
2) specific licensing and inspection procedures for nursing
homes; and
3) licensing and inspection procedures for health-related
facilities in general that apply to nursing homes."19
sprinlder systems, the flammability of the structure, fire escapes, fire doors,
and similar safeguards. Facilities are required to comply with the LSC
to be eligible for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, but in spite of
this requirement more than half of the homes fail to comply.
Brown, supra note 81, at 320-21 (footnotes omitted).
1
9 See AL . CODE tit. 22, §§204(42)-(58) (1958 & Cum. Supp. 1973) and
tit. 46, §§189(48)-(63) (Cum. Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. §§08.70.010-.180
(Supp. 1976); A=z. REv. STAT. ANN. §§36-401 to 432 (1974) and §§36-446,
36-466.01-.09 (Supp. 1976); Anx. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-2201 to -2215 (Supp. 1973);
CAL. Bus. & PNOF. CODE §§ 3901-3950 (West 1974 & Supp. 1977); CAL. HEALTh
& SAFETY CODE §§ 1417-1439 (West Supp. 1977); COLO. RPv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
39-101 to 114 (1973 & Supp. 1976), § 25-1-120 (Supp. 1976), and §§ 12-13-101
to 134 (1973 & Supp. 1976); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-591 to 626 (1977);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1101-1110 and 1201-1213 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 400.021-.327 (1973 & Supp. 1977) and 468.163-178 (Supp. 1977); GA. CODE
AN . §§ 84-4901 to 4913 (1975 & Supp. 1977) and §§ 88-1901 to 1912 (1971 &
Supp. 1977); HAwAir REv. STAT. §321-11 (1968) and §§475B-1 to 12 (Supp.
1975); IDAHo CODE §§54-1601 to 1616 (Supp. 1976) and §§39-3301 to 3309
(Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1113-, §§35.16-.31 and §§35.101-.132 (Smith-
Hurd 1977); IND. Ai'N. STAT. §§ 16-10-2-1 to 19 (Bums 1973) and §§ 25-19-1-1
to 12 (Bums 1974 & Supp. 1976); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 135C.1-.48 (1972 & Supp.
1977) and §§ 147.118-.134 (1972 & Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-923 to
944 (1973 & Supp. 1976) and §§ 65-3501 to 3507 (1972 & Supp. 1976); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 216.405-.485 and §§ 216A.010-.990 (1977); LA. REv. STAT.
§§ 37:2501-2511 (1974) and §§ 40:2009.1-2009.12 (1974 & 1977); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1811-1824 (1964, Supp. 1975 & Supp. 1976); MD.. AUNN.
CODE: art. 43, §§556-568 (1971 & Supp. 1976), §§767-780 (1971 & Supp. 1976),
and art. 70B, § 5 (Supp. 1976); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 111 §§ 71-73 (1975 and
Supp. 1977) and ch. 112, §§ 108-117 (1975); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 331.651-
.660 and 338.1181-1192 (1976); MnIN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144A.01-.611 (Cum. Supp.
1977); Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 43-11-1 to 27 (1972 & Supp. 1977) and §§ 73-17-1 to
15 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 198.011-.170 (Vernon 1972) and §§ 344.010-.100
(Vernon Cum. Supp. 1977); MOm.rr. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 69-5201 to 5224 (1970 &
Supp. 1975) and § 82A-1602.17 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-2017 to
2045.09 (1976); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 449.015-.240 (1963); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 151:1-18 (1964 & Supp. 1975) and §§ 151-A:1-14 (Supp. 1975); NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§30:11-1 to 28 (1964 & Supp. 1977) and §§30:13-1 to 11 (Supp. 1977);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-34-1 to 23 (1976) and §§ 67-37-1 to 15 (1974); N.Y. PU.
Hsr.ma LAw §§ 2800-2811 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1976-1977) and §§ 2895-2898
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1976-1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-275.1 to 288 (1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-34-01 to 14 (Supp. 1977) and §§ 50-18-01 to 08 (1974 &
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All states regulate nursing homes through one or more of these
procedures. Only Maine, Nevada, and Utah fail to license nursing
home administrators. Most states require regular inspection as a
prerequisite to license renewal. At least two states have recently
enacted comprehensive laws governing resident rights, including
mechanisms to hold licensed professionals and institutions account-
able for violations of these rights.120 Nevertheless, state standards
are generally less comprehensive than federal standards.
3. Violations
Violations of federal and state regulations are widespread.
It has been reported that
evidence is mounting that more than half the nursing
homes in this nation are abusing the public trust; patients
frequently are neglected or physically abused, their money
and property is stolen, their very lives are endangered, and
massive misuse of public funds is commonplace in the
industry. Further, despite the nation's enormous moral
and monetary investment in the nursing home industry,
public agencies entrusted with the regulation of nursing
homes have been ineffectual in preventing these abuses. 121
Not only are regulations rarely enforced, but when they are,
the available remedies of decertification or termination of provider
Supp. 1977); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3721.01-.99 (Page 1971 and Supp. 1977)
and §§ 4751.01-.99 (Page 1977); OXT.A. STAT. AN. tit. 63, §§ 1-801 to 861 (1973
& Supp. 1976-1977) and §§330.21-.60 (1973 & Supp. 1976-1977); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 442.005-.990 (1975) and §§ 678.710-.990 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62,
§§ 1001-1031 (1968) and tit. 63, §§ 1101-1114 (Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GE-N.
LAws ANx. § 5-45-1 to 13 (1976), §§ 23-17.1-1 to 19 (Supp. 1976), §§ 23-17.2-1
to 7 (Supp. 1976) and §§ 23-17.3-1 to 6 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE ANx. §§ 40-35-10
to 140 (1976), §§ 43-28-10 to 60 (Supp. 1977) and §§ 43-29-10 to 80 (Supp.
1977); S.D. CODE §§ 34-12-1 to 22 (1977) and §§ 36-28-1 to 28 (1977); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 53-1301 to 1330 (1977) and §§ 63-1601 to 1613 (1976 & Supp.
1976); TEx. RFv. STAT. ANN. arts. 4442c-4442d (1976); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§26-15-65 to 78 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§2001-2015 (Cum. Supp.
1977) and §§ 2051-2061 (Cum. Supp. 1977); VA. CoDE AN,-. §§ 32-261.1 to 310
(1973 & Supp. 1977), and §§54-899 to 907 (1974); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.51.005-900 (1961 & Supp. 1976) and §§ 18.52.010-.900 (1961 and Supp.
1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5C-1 to 17 (Supp. 1977) and §§ 30-25-1 to 11
(Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 50.01-.03 (Supp. 1977-1978) and §§ 456.01-.11
(1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§33-291.1 to .10 (Supp. 1975) and §§35-85 to 97
(1959 & Supp. 1975).
120 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2801-11 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 50.02-.03 (Supp. 1977-1978). Following enactment of the
New York statute, the New York Health Department closed 63 nursing homes.
Legislative Notes, New York's Revised Nursing Home Legislation, 9 U. Mica. J.
L. .w REF. 375, 392 (1976).
121 Brown, supra note 81, at 305 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 126:578
TREATMENT RIGHTS
agreements are counter-productive because of their severity. Clos-
ing a nursing home can cause negative health consequences for those
who must be relocated. 22 A bed may not be available elsewhere
due to the shortage of nursing home beds in many areas; substitute
nursing facilities, even if available, may not abide by applicable
regulations. Consequently, a state will continue to license and
sanction the operation of facilities with serious deficiencies for
extended periods of time. One observer notes that
[t]here is a labyrinth of waivers and extensions
through which any nursing home can postpone indefinitely
the necessity of meeting federal certification standards.
Only if the deficiencies substantially limit a facility's
capacity to render adequate care or adversely affect the
health and safety of the patients will a facility be ineligible
for certification. In addition, HEW gives state licensing
authorities unlimited discretion to relax state licensing
standards and certify SNFs for Medicare participation if
they formerly met state licensing standards, even if they
currently fail to meet such standards.
123
Brown notes that the effectiveness of termination or nonrenewal
as a remedy for deficient care or dangerous conditions has been
further diminished by recent cases that require a due process hearing
prior to termination of funding.124 During hearings, patients re-
main in the home, and seriously deficient nursing homes continue
to operate and be reimbursed. 125
Other possible controls over violations include license sus-
pension, reimbursement control, appointment of a receiver, and
injunctive relief.126 Public sanctions may also include fines and
122 See note 64 supra.
123 Gassel, supra note 107, at 211 (footnotes omitted).
124 Brown, upra note 81, at 334-35. See Maxwell v. Wyman, 458 F.2d 1146
(2d Cir. 1972); Ross v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 369 F. Supp.
570 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Coral Gables Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Bichardson, 340
F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Contra, Paramount Convalescent Center, Inc. v.
Dep't of Health Care Servs., 15 Cal. 3d 489, 542 P.2d 1, 125 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976).
125 Brown, supra note 81, at 337.
126 Brown sees the injunction as "particularly well suited to correct hazardous
conditions or violations of patients' rights." Id. 341. Contrast this position with
that found in Note, supra note 20, at 1341-42, which states that in "total" or
"closed" institutions, preventive injunctions or monetary damages are inadequate to
remedy institutional conditions which are "widespread systemic violations of con-
stitutional rights."
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criminal proceedings against nursing home operators.127 Public
enforcement has been notoriously lax, however, and present sanc-
tions are admittedly inadequate. The sorry state of the nursing
home inspection/enforcement morass was characterized in the
Senate Subcommittee's report as a "national farce." 128
4. Private Remedies
Given the present inability or unwillingness of the public
sector to regulate nursing homes aggressively in order to secure a
high quality of care for residents, the possibility of private remedies
should be examined.129  Nursing home residents can sue in tort,
either for negligence or for intentional injury. ProQf of causation,
however, is frequently difficult to establish. 30 An action based on
breach of contract has a greater likelihood of success, especially for
those patients under life care contracts. 3 1  Although patients are
generally reluctant to compel the home to provide the contracted
services because of their dependent status, actions by the estates of
deceased patients might have a beneficial deterrent effect., 2
Other possible contract actions include third-party beneficiary
suits by Medicaid or Medicare recipients 1s3 and actions for breach
127 Criminal sanctions have been noticeably ineffective as a deterrent, as is
frequently the case with white collar crime. As Brown notes: "[s]ubstantial trial
delays are available and violations must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, criminal sanctions result only in retribution against the owner rather than
rehabilitation of the facility." Brown, supra note 81, at 343.
128 INTtRoDUcToRY EPORT, supra note 8, at 76.
129 Brown, supra note 81, at 346 n.282, and Gassel, supra note 107, at 214,
observe that nursing homes have the same legal rights and responsibilities as hospi-
tals and are thus liable to tort claims and contract actions. In addition, Gassel
notes: "The patient may be able to sue the nursing home in federal court for
violation of these quality standards. If the violation threatens the patient's health
or life, it may be a deprivation of due process under the fourteenth amendment,
or another constitutional deprivation .... ." Id. 215.
130 Brown, supra note 81, at 346-48.
131 A life care contract, common in the nursing home industry, is "an arrange-
ment whereby the patient turns over all of his assets to the nursing home in
exchange for a promise that he will be cared for completely until death." Id. 350.
The potential for abuse has led some jurisdictions, notably New York and California,
respectively to prohibit and regulate such contracts strictly. Id.
132 d. 351.
133 See id. 352.
[T]he right of utility users, indigent persons unable to pay for medical
care, and other intended beneficiaries of public contracts to sue as third-
party beneficiaries has been upheld. The intended beneficiaries of the
provider agreement are the individuals residing in the home who are
eligible for Medicaid or Medicare. Where the care provided fails to meet
applicable standards, the resident should be entitled to sue the home as
the third-party beneficiary of the provider agreement. Recognition of this
right would enable nursing home residents to sue homes that fail to provide
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of an implied warranty of compliance with federal regulations.134
Additionally, if the nursing home sues the patient for damages in
an action for payment of services rendered, the patient might assert
as an affirmative defense that the home's failure to meet statutory
standards renders the contract void.185
Unfortunately, private actions have proved as unsuccessful as
public actions in establishing quality care for nursing home resi-
dents and in protecting them from abuse. 86 Many residents are
unaware of their rights. Even if private contracts have been made,
residents may be unable to exercise their rights: isolation and
impoverishment make it difficult to obtain legal services; dependency
makes many residents fearful to report abuse; restraints and medi-
cation may effectively incapacitate recalcitrant patients.'3 7
Growing public awareness of these problems has led to the
implementation of patient advocates or ombudsmen in some
states.138 Brown proposes a system modeled on the grievance pro-
cedure promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. That system
requires each local housing authority to establish griev-
ance procedures which tenants may utilize to resolve com-
plaints by or against the authority. Each authority must
establish a mechanism for submission of complaints and
must give the complainant an opportunity for a hearing
which must be presided over by a hearing officer or a panel
consisting of tenants, authority employees, and impartial
persons. 3 9
This brief survey of the statutory and contractual rights of
nursing home residents, although not intended to be comprehensive,
reveals the difficulties inherent in placing excessive reliance on
either source to protect residents who receive inferior care. The
plight of patients often prevents them from effectively enforcing
their own rights; there has been a distinct dearth of litigation of
adequate care and would free them from dependence on public enforce-
ment efforts.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
134 See id. 352-53.
135 Id. 353.
130 For a discussion of why traditional legal remedies such as habeas corpus,
medical malpractice, and torts are inadequate for mental patients, see NAAG, supra
note 43, at 27. This reasoning would presumably apply to nursing home residents.
137 See Brown, supra note 81, at 354.
'38 See id. 355-56.
139 Id. 354 (footnote omitted).
1978]
610 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
nursing home residents' rights. 140 The nature of the inspection
process, and the drastic remedy that may be required when serious
deficiencies are uncovered, limits its usefulness. Implementation
of an ombudsman program may ameliorate conditions in some
situations, but its utility remains to be tested.141 All these avenues
should certainly be explored and improved wherever possible. In
view of the seriousness of the problem involved, however, alterna-
tive means of improving the lot of nursing home residents should be
developed. Extending the constitutional right to treatment to
former mental patients is a significant step in this direction. 42  The
delineation of the constitutional rights of mentally ill nursing home
residents also serves an important role because the statutory rights
of these persons come under enormous political pressure, and may
broaden or contract with the times.
143
140 One notable exception is Smith v. O'Halloran, No. 75-M-539 (D. Colo.
1976). In this class action suit, plaintiffs were all young Medicaid recipients
suffering from severe physical disability. Plaintiff Smith, who had resided at a
nursing home for over three years, became seriously ill and was taken to a local
hospital. While he was hospitalized, the nursing home forged an "X" on his Social
Security check, cashed it, and credited the amount to Smith's nursing home account
without his authorization or knowledge. Upon learning of this incident, Smith
sought legal assistance. The nursing home administration was outraged by his
actions and told him to leave within a week; the administrator then circulated a
memo warning residents not to seek legal assistance and fired sevezal sympathetic
employees. At this point, a complaint was filed in the district court. Plaintiffs
attacked the current model of nursing home care, alleging violations by the home
of the residents' constitutional and statutory rights and failure of the state and
federal governments to enforce the standards and quality of medical care guaran-
teed to Medicaid recipients in nursing homes by federal regulation. See text
accompanying notes 105-15 supra.
141 In six states, nursing home ombudsman programs have been established
with the objective of improving conditions in nursing homes by establishing offices
to receive and resolve complaints. Funded by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, all but one of these programs are associated with state governments,
although not with the agency having enforcement responsibilities over nursing
homes. Although the powers of these programs vary, none is empowered to impose
fines or other sanctions on noncomplying facilities. Rather, they act as complaint
and information centers. Brown, supra note 81, at 356.
142 This extension would still not solve all the problems in this area. For
example, the right to treatment exists only as long as the individual is involuntarily
confined by the state; the right vanishes upon release by the state. Although
release would be a welcome and workable remedy for a large portion of involuntary
residents of nursing homes, a substantial number of nursing home residents are not
prepared to adjust to life in the community. These patients may still require a
form of "aftercare." See Saphire, The Civilly-Committed Public Mental Patient
and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. Rtv. 232 (1976); See also Marschall,
A Critique of the "Right to Treatment" Approach, in TnE MqTArr y ILL AND THE
RICH" To T EAmNr (G. Morris ed. 1970).
143 For example, cutbacks were made in Medicare coverage in 1969, I~mo-
nucTonY REPoRT, supra note 8, at 30-33, and many patients were reclassified to
lower levels of care in a Medicaid cost-cutting move. Id. 43. These retroactive
cutbacks sparked numerous suits by patients concerning due process rights prior to
the termination of benefits. See, e.g., Hultzman v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 1276 (3d
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B. A Constitutional Right to Treatment
The constitutional bases for a right to treatment for mental
patients transferred to nursing homes are found in the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. They
include the guarantee of freedom from cruel and unusual punish-
ment, due process protections, and the right to equal protection
under the law. An analysis of the right to treatment, however, must
look beyond the injury suffered by the nursing home resident. The
confinement of former mental patients in nursing homes must be
shown to involve the involuntary restriction of liberty by the state.
Therefore, the questions of voluntariness and state action will be
examined. Involuntarily committed patients of mental hospitals
who have been relocated in nursing homes should be deemed to
enjoy the rights articulated in Wyatt v. Stickney and its progeny.
Following that analysis, the potential efficacy of treatment for
mentally ill nursing home residents will be considered.
1. Voluntariness
The right to treatment litigation has established that certain
rights are enjoyed by patients in mental hospitals whose commit-
ment is involuntary. Whether a commitment is "voluntary" is
often uncertain.
The voluntary patient's freedom is . . often more
tenuous than it appears. First, in most states, hospitals
may hold him without hearing for several days, even weeks,
after he has requested his release. Second, many persons
voluntarily commit themselves under the implied threat
that they will otherwise be committed against their will.
And, third, patients are often misled about the nature of
the "voluntary" status and further misled into believing
that hospitalization is in their best interest. A patient
often rests his decision to enter or remain in a hospital on
a belief, instilled or nursed by hospital staff, that he
"'needs" to be hospitalized, when all the staff has any
foundation for claiming is that he suffers from a mental
illness and needs some form of help somewhere.
144
The same coercive influences, some subtle, some not so subtle,
often underlie a "voluntary" nursing home admission. When the
Cir. 1974); Bidgeley v. Secretary of H.E.W., 475 F.2d 1222 (4th Cir. 1973);
Reading v. Bichardson, 339 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
144 Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 McH. L. REv. 1107, 1183 (1972) (foot-
notes omitted).
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voluntary admission is closely examined, it is often found to be
based upon a failure to object rather than upon an expressed desire
to be committed.14 5 This situation is especially common with
patients requiring extended care.146 The unreliability of such
"consent" was considered by one court:
Even if positive objection is not required by the Mental
Hygiene Department, the consent thus extracted is dubious
because the senile is not likely to understand that the
admitting institution is a mental institution, even if he be
told that it is. Often he is chagrined and humiliated fol-
lowing family rejection and has neither the will nor the
capacity to object even if he be carefully advised.
47
Given the gravity of a commitment decision, consent, to be
valid, must be informed. Yet few patients have pertinent knowledge
about the nursing homes in which they are to be placed. 48 One
study revealed that only ten out of twenty former mental patients
who were admitted to a nursing home directly from a mental hos-
pital had any foreknowledge of the nursing home or of the move.
49
In addition a substantial element of deceit often induces the
initial placement in the nursing home, undermining any truly
valid consent. People are often brought to nursing homes under
the pretense that their stay will be "temporary"-just until they get
better, or until their children return from vacation. Once a patient
is admitted "voluntarily," release often becomes a practical im-
possibility, particularly if the resident is a pauper.
For elderly people in poor health who are without family or
financial support, institutionalization is in effect compulsory if they
wish to receive Medicaid coverage for needed health care. 50
Doctors, realizing that a patient has no financial or family support,
often routinely prescribe nursing home residency. The present
government reimbursement policy under Medicaid/Medicare creates
145 Current Comment, Symposium on the Aging Poor, 23 SYRACTJSE L. REV. 45,
53 (1972).
1461d.
147 In re "Jones," 9 Misc. 2d 1084, 1085-86, 172 N.Y.S.2d 869, 870 (Sup. Ct.
1958) (emphasis in original).
14s See text accompanying note 74 supra.
'49 See Dominick, Greenblatt & Stotsky, The Adjustment of Aged Persons in
Nursing Homes, 16 J. Am. GEnmrmcs Soc'Y 63, 67 (1968). The residents sur-
veyed were a select group of ex-mental patients who were verbally communicative
and well-oriented. Foreknowledge among more regressed mental patients was
certainly at least equally rare.
150 See Munger, Medicare and Medicaid: The Failure of the Present Health
Care System for the Elderly, 17 Ariz. L. REv. 522, 533-34 (1975).
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a strong financial incentive for many families to institutionalize
their elderly members, often against the wishes of both parties.15'
To be truly voluntary, of course, consent must continue during
residency; not only entrance, but also discharge, must be readily
obtainable. Life in total institutional settings has been shown to
breed dependency and dehabilitation, thereby decreasing the like-
lihood of discharge. 15 2 This phenomenon may be accentuated by
the confluence of two common attributes of the nursing home
setting-lack of periodic review of admissions and the profit motive.
Hospitals routinely discharge chronic patients to nursing homes for
convalescence or for custodial boarding; these administrative trans-
fers often result in lifetime placements without consent or review.
The lack of review may actually be welcomed by the nursing home
management for whom full occupancy is a primary goal. Obviously
full occupancy and maximization of profit are antithetical to the
goals of rehabilitation and discharge.
15 3
2. The Special Case of Former Mental Patients
The preceding section has questioned the characterization of
commitment in an institutional setting as truly voluntary. Three
specific situations may arise involving former patients of mental
hospitals: the involuntary placement, the "volunteered" placement,
and the voluntary placement.
a. The Involuntary Placement
When mental patients are directly transferred by the state from
a mental hospital to a nursing home without any opportunity to
consent or object to the move, or are told that they have no choice
but to consent to the transfer, the strongest argument for a consti-
151 Contrary to the position of Parsons, Definitions of Health and Illness in
Light of American Values and Social Structure, in PATIENTS, PRYsscrLAUs AN
ILLNF-ss 165 (E. Jaco ed. 1958), empirical research has shown that modem families
do not eagerly transfer their sick to institutions. The noninstitutionalized are cared
for by a spouse, or, if widowed, by an adult child. Fourteen percent of the elderly
are impaired, but only five percent are in institutions. Brody, Basic Data Require-
ments for Geriatric Institutions and Services, 14 MED. CArE 60 (No. 5 Supp. 1976).
Institutionalization is precipitated primarily by a change in the family structure.
At that point, the nuclear family appears unable to maintain the sick, and insti-
tutionalization occurs. These findings suggest that rather than financially encour-
aging the institutionalization of old people, home care to help the family maintain
the sick should be provided. For a discussion of the contrasts between English and
American efforts in this regard, see INTRODUcToRY REPORT, supra note 8, at 58.
152 See E. GoFmAN, Asx srs (1961); A. STANTON & M. ScMvARTz, THr
MENTAL HOSPrrAL (1954).
153 See note 18 supra.
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tutional right to treatment exists.154 Placement in a nursing home
results from the same sort of influences that exist in the civil com-
mitment process, often without its procedural safeguards. In juris-
dictions where mental patients enjoy a right to treatment, that
right cannot be negated merely by changing the locale of confine-
ment. A patient's mental condition is unchanged; commitment
remains involuntary. Constitutional guarantees that accompany
such confinement do not disappear merely because the state has
relocated the patient in a new facility a few miles down the road.
b. The "Volunteered" Placement
Some courts are willing to probe beneath the trappings of vol-
untariness to determine if a patient's custody is in fact attributable
to the patient's own wishes. 155 Such questions are most likely to
arise when a person is "volunteered" for institutionalization by a
member of his or her family.158 In the context of parental volun-
teering of children for confinement in state institutions, one ob-
server suggests that "the parents' 'voluntary' decision to commit a
mentally ill or retarded child should almost never be considered
voluntary as to the child, for the interests of parent and child
(especially when the parents are considering expelling him from
their home) may greatly conflict." 1s An even greater divergence
of interests-and a similar lack of true voluntariness-may exist
when children volunteer parents 158 or when the state volunteers
an unwanted charge for transfer to a nursing home. 59
154 This argument is contingent, of course, upon a preexisting determination
within the jurisdiction that involuntarily committed patients in mental hospitals have
such a right.
'55 See, e.g., Pima County Pub. Fiduciary v. Superior Court, 26 Ariz. App. 85,
546 P.2d 354 (1976); In re Long, 25 N.C. App. 702, 214 S.E.2d 626, cert. denied,
288 N.C. 241, 217 S.E.2d 665 (1975). Cf. Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121 (1st
Cir. 1976) (voluntariness irrelevant if patients are by reason of disability sufficiently
helpless that they are confined de facto if not de jure). For a discussion of the
pressures sometimes applied to induce self-commitment, see Gilboy & Schmidt,
"Voluntary" Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 429 (1971).
156 For an excellent discussion of children volunteered for confinement in state
institutions, see Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to
Mental Institutions, 62 CAtr. L. REv. 840 (1974).
157 Chambers, Right to the Least Restrictive Alternative Setting for Treatment,
in LEGAL MliuTs OF THE MEzTALy HArNDICAPPED 1004 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman
eds. 1974).
158 A declaration that a parent is incompetent may give a child effective control
over the parent's assets.
159 Transfer to a nursing home may relieve the state of a substantial financial
burden, shifting the bulk of the expense to Medicaid funds.
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In Saville v. Treadway,160 the court approved a consent agree-
ment which provided that
mentally retarded persons [in a Tennessee Developmental
Center] have a right to proper medical care and physical
restoration and to such education, training, and guidance
as will enable them to develop their individual ability and
potential to the fullest possible extent, no matter how
severe the degree of disability; and that such persons have
a right to an environment least restrictive to their liberty
in that individual liberty is to be restricted to no greater
degree than is necessary and appropriate to provide
habilitative services.'"'
The most significant aspect of this case is the court's holding that
the rights elaborated accrued to patients who were voluntarily ad-
mitted in the sense that they were committed by their parents. The
court thereby recognized the "possible conflicts of interest between
a mentally retarded child and ... a parent." 162 Analogous poten-
tial conflicts in the case of volunteered elderly patients favor ac-
cording them similar rights. Their institutionalization should be
scrutinized in like fashion to ascertain whether commitment was
actually involuntary.
c. The "Voluntary" Placement
The voluntary nursing home mental patient comes from one
of two classes of people-those who were originally voluntarily self-
committed to a state mental hospital or those whose legal status
was changed from "involuntary" to "voluntary" during their tenure
in the mental hospital. Conversion of a patient's status from in-
voluntary to voluntary involves the issue of the patient's competence
to consent to such a change. This question was examined by the
New York Court of Appeals in In re Buttonow.16 3
Buttonow concerned an involuntarily committed incompetent
mental patient whose status was changed to voluntary approxi-
mately five years after her admission. The change of status to
voluntary forfeited certain legal protections she enjoyed as an invol-
untary patient.164 The court recognized that the loss of rights due
100 404 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
161 Id 433.
162 Id. 432.
.03 23 N.Y.2d 385, 244 N.E.2d 677, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1968).
164 See id. at 390-92, 244 N.E.2d at 679-81, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02 (loss of
period review, right to jury trial on issue of sanity, automatic study of admission
by Mental Health Information Service).
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to an administrative conversion of status raises grave doubts as to
the constitutionality of the conversion based on equal protection
and perhaps due process grounds.16 5 In its analysis the Buttonow
court cited an earlier opinion of Justice Brenner:
Certainly, the acts of the mentally ill and the aged se-
nile who accommodate themselves to the pressures of the
hospital officials for acceptance of voluntary status and who
are either unknowing, meek or co-operative, ought not
thereby to be induced to forego rights accorded to those less
amenable to co-operation. What is more, since a person
admitted and detained as mentally ill is unable to make
sound judgments, the law should be especially solicitous
for his welfare and not, as here, encourage its officials to
induce or beguile such a patient, in the midst of his con-
fusion and agony, to make judgments of doubtful
integrity. 166
The court's reasoning acknowledged the fundamental problems
such conversions create:
If the patient cannot understand written notice of his
rights, and no one else is informed of his incarceration, the
right to release become chimerical. In such circumstances,
the "voluntary" patient is deprived of his liberty, yet re-
view is left to the very people who are detaining him-
the hospital staff.'67
In re Buttonow illustrates judicial concern with de facto as
well as de jure voluntariness. When a patient's status has under-
gone conversion during his or her confinement, coercive pressures
on that patient at the time of consent to the change in the status of
commitment will invalidate the voluntariness of the procedure,
thus giving rise to those constitutional rights associated with the
involuntary restriction of liberty.
165 Id. at 392, 244 N.E.2d at 681, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 102. Judge Keating, in
a concurring opinion, saw the issue more properly as a due process consideration:
A State may not, consistent with "due process", place any mentally ill
person in the custody of any person or institution unless it makes some
provision for periodic review of the propriety and suitability of the con-
finement before some impartial forum in which the incompetent is repre-
sented by a person or agency wholly committed to that person's interest.
Id. at 394, 244 N.E.2d at 682, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 104 (Keating, J., concurring).
166 Id. at 391, 244 N.E.2d at 680, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02, quoting Kaminstein
v. Brooklyn State Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 57, 63-64, 266 N.Y.S.2d 916, 923 (Sup. Ct.
1966).
1137 d. at 391-92, 244 N.E.2d at 680, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 102, quoting Note,
The New York Mental Health Service: A New Approach to Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 67 CoLum. L. R~v. 672, 696 (1967).
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When a patient is initially admitted to a state mental hospital
through voluntary self-commitment, however, it is difficult to con-
struct a viable legal theory of a constitutional right to treatment.
After all, the state has no obligation to provide services to its
residents. 6" Once the state accepts voluntary patients, however,
rights may thereby be created in certain situations to provide some
degree of protection.
d. Treatment Rights of Voluntary Patients
Two recent cases have held that voluntary patients living in
state institutions have a constitutional right to protection from
harm.169 In at least one instance, the court intimated that treatment
may be a necessary component of such protection. In litigation
involving New York's Willowbrook State School for the Mentally
Retarded, Judge Judd of the Eastern District of New York held
that the voluntary status of many residents precluded a finding that
they were entitled to a constitutional right to treatment. 170 Judge
Judd did emphatically state, however, that "[p]ersons who live in
state custodial institutions are owed certain constitutional duties by
the state and its officials." 171
Specifically, the court held that the residents of Willowbrook
enjoyed a right to be free from harm.172 Because freedom was not
a viable possibility for Willowbrook's residents notwithstanding
their voluntary status, the court ruled that they were entitled to
living conditions at least comparable to those the state must provide
for prisoners. 7 3 Like Judge Johnson in Wyatt, Judge Judd ordered
the upgrading of staffing ratios, increased treatment programs, im-
proved living standards, and discontinuation of certain overly re-
strictive policies.174
168Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970) (courts may not
second-guess state's determination of its own social policy).
169 See Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121 (1st Cir. 1976); New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
("The consent judgment reflects the fact that protection from harm requires relief
more extensive than this court originally contemplated, because harm can result
not only from neglect but from conditions which cause regression or which prevent
development of an individual's capabilities." Id.).
170 New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357
F. Supp. 752, 759 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
171Id. 764.
172 Id. 758.
173 Id. 764.
174 See id. 768-69.
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In Harper v. Cserr 175 the husband of a voluntary mental
patient who had committed suicide while in a state institution
brought an action based on the Civil Rights Act 171 and pendent
state claims for wrongful death. Although the court rejected the
notion that a voluntary patient has a right to treatment,
177 it
acknowledged that the right to protection from harm might applyYs
The court recognized the existence of such a right to protection
from harm for all involuntarily committed persons; however, in
regard to voluntary patients, the court limited the right's ap-
plicability to those "voluntarily committed persons . . . who by
reason of a disability are to a great degree helpless; and, if not
confined de jure, are at least confined de facto." 179 Therefore,
even though a normal negligence or malpractice complaint would
not succeed under section 1983,
if plaintiff could establish a sufficient combination of
helplessness on the part of the deceased and wanton callous-
ness on the part of those caring for her, her case might
cross the line from a tort to a § 1983 case stating a claim
under the eighth amendment or possibly even the due
process clause of the fourteenth. 80
Although the Harper court restricted Judge Judd's formulation
of a right to protection from harm by limiting it to involuntarily
committed patients and those voluntary patients who are severely
disabled, both opinions have significant implications for the develop-
ment of the rights of mentally ill nursing home patients. In each
case the court manifested a willingness to examine closely the con-
ditions of a person's commitment to determine if the commitment
was de facto involuntary, even though it had the trappings of legal
voluntariness.
e. Summary
An examination of the conditions under which individuals are
often committed to institutions and of their true ability to secure
release once they have been admitted shows the tentativeness of any
conclusion that a patient's presence is, in fact, voluntary. When
3.75544 F.2d 1121 (1st Cir. 1976).
17642 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1970).
177 544 F.2d at 1122.
178 Id. 1122-23.
179Id. 1123.
's0 Id. 1124.
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an elderly family member is volunteered for nursing home resi-
dency-often against the wishes of the elderly member, or under
conditions suggesting coercion or deceit-a finding of voluntariness
is highly suspect. Similarly, when the state volunteers involuntarily
committed mental patients for nursing home placement, or ad-
ministratively changes their status to voluntary and then transfers
them without informed consent, the concomitant loss of any rights
must be exactingly scrutinized. As Chief Justice Burger noted:
"There can be no doubt that involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual for any
reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish
without due process of law." 181
A probing analysis of the true nature of a nursing home resi-
dent's confinement, such as the factual determination made by those
courts that have elaborated the right to protection from harm, will
reveal that certain groups of nursing home residents are de facto,
if not de jure, involuntarily confined. Involuntary residents include
those mental patients who are still technically committed, but who
have been moved from a mental hospital to a nursing home by the
state; those who are so helpless they cannot leave; those whose
mental capacity does not allow them to make a voluntary decision
whether to stay or leave; those who are told they have no choice
as to where to live; and those whose will is overborne by medication,
hospital personnel, or a guardian. The remaining issue as to
whether these involuntary residents have a constitutional right to
treatment requires consideration of whether they are being con-
fined by the state or through state action.
3. State Action
Whether state action exists in a given context is a complicated,
confusing issue. This problem is exemplified by the case of
ostensibly private health care institutions, including nursing homes,
that receive significant funding from the state. The Supreme Court
has not addressed the state action question in such cases, and no
published opinion from any federal court addresses this issue in the
context of nursing homes, although at least one such case is pending
in a lower court.18 2 As for hospitals receiving government assistance
under the Hill-Burton Act, 8 3 Medicaid, Medicare, or state assistance
18 1 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, CJ., con-
curring).
182 See note 140 supra.
383 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2 91-291o (Supp.
V 1975).
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programs, seven circuits have found that no state action is present.1
Only the Fourth Circuit has reached the opposite result.1  Most
of these cases have involved due process challenges by doctors who
have been denied staff privileges by a hospital 186 or by patients who
have been denied an abortion or sterilization.8 7 Notwithstanding
the degree of government assistance and regulation, the majority of
these cases have found insufficient state involvement with private
hospitals for the fourteenth amendment to apply.
In a case where an individual is involuntarily committed to
the mental health system of the state, however, state action is obvi-
ous. If the state later designates a nursing home as a less restric-
tive alternative 188 or as a more appropriate facility for such
commitment, 8 9 then the state has simply contracted its responsibili-
ties out to the nursing home as its agent. In that case rights guar-
anteed to persons confined by the state in its own institutions should
logically be extended to those confined in nursing homes. This
group would include continuing mental patients, "former" mental
patients, and patients confined as a result of protective custody
commitments who have either been placed in a nursing home or
remained under the direct responsibility of the state.
In other cases the state's involvement in nursing home residency
is not as immediately obvious. It is clear, however, that nursing
184 See, e.g., Briscoe v. Bock, 540 F.2d 392 (8th Cir. 1976); Taylor v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948 (1976);
Watkins v. Mercy Med. Center, 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975); Greco v. Orange
Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S., 1000
(1975); Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pacific Med. Center, Inc., 507 F.2d
1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308
(9th Cir. 1974); Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp., Inc., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479
F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.
1973); Barrett v. -United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem. 506 F.2d
1395 (2d Cir. 1974).
185 See Doe v. Charleston Area Med. Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.
1975).
186 E.g., Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pacific Med. Center, Inc., 507
F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974).
187 E.g., Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.
1974).
188 See, e.g., Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
189 See, e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 22, § 320(5) (Cum. Supp. 1973), authorizing
the Alabama mental health board to transfer geriatric patients requiring primary
treatment for their infirmities "to private nursing homes within the state of Alabama
if it finds such action to be in the public interest." Id.
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homes are largely financed by public funds,190 are under extensive
state and federal regulation, 91 and perform a public service.' 92
Although useful heuristically to demonstrate government involve-
ment in nursing homes, these criteria alone are insufficient to estab-
lish state action. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 1 93 established
that, in addition to government involvement with the institution
challenged, there must be a nexus between the government and the
challenged activity; lack of this nexus has been the basis for numer-
ous decisions finding no state action. 194 It has been suggested,
however, that this hurdle may be more easily surmountable when
the private body challenged is performing a government function °3
A finding of state action in the case of nursing homes is more
easily justified than in the case of hospitals. This analysis begins
with the Fourth Circuit's reasoning underlying its finding of state
action in the case of hospitals, but builds upon certain character-
istics of nursing homes that make such a finding more compelling
than in the case of hospitals. The Fourth Circuit has held that a
hospital's use of a Hill-Burton construction grant is sufficient to
imbue the hospital with state action.19 As to hospitals, however,
the opposite conclusion reached by seven other circuits undermines
the force of such authority.' 7 Nursing homes, however, are dis-
tinguishable from hospitals in several significant respects. First of
all, nursing homes receive a larger portion of their funding from
1 9o The National Center for Health Care estimates that, from 1973 to 1975,
9 billion dollars was spent on nursing homes, of which 5.2 billion dollars came from
public funds. Mueller & Gibson, National Health Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1975,
SocrAL SEcuHxrY Boxwr mr, February, 1976 (HEW Pub. No. (SSA) 76-11703).
See generally Brown, supra note 81, at 310-11.
191 See text accompanying notes 104-20 supra.
192 "The legislative history of Title XIX indicates that Congress considered the
delivery of basic health service to be a governmental responsibility. In its desire
to provide expanded health care to needy persons, Congress recognized nursing
home care as an indispensible component of the comprehensive program." Health
Law Project, Legal Problems Inherent in Organizing Nursing Home Occupants,
6 CLEAIINGaousE REv. 203, 205 (1972) (footnotes deleted).
193419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). No government funding was involved in
Jackson.
194 E.g., Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d
873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975); New York City Jaycees, Inc.
v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1975).
'95 See Note, State Action ia the Health Field, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 1188,
1194-96 (1975).
196 See Doe v. Charlestown Area Med. Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638, 642 (4th
Cir. 1975).
3.97 See note 184 supra.
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the state than do hospitals. 98 Coupled with the fact that nursing
homes are at least as heavily regulated as hospitals, this criterion is
the initial basis for a stronger case for state action.
Second, the nursing home is a total residential environment;
unlike hospitals, most of its residents are not transient. The scope
of services a nursing home provides for its residents exceeds that
of a public housing project 109 and is at least as great as a company
town 200 in which state action has been found.
Third, the injury alleged in most of the hospital cases is dis-
tinct from the injury that may result in the case of nursing homes.
Most of the hospital cases were brought by a doctor who had been
denied staff privileges or by a patient who was unable to secure an
abortion or sterilization in a particular hospital. Although those
deprivations were certainly not insignificant, in each of those cases
other alternatives were available to the.plaintiffs. Doctors are free
to practice elsewhere; hospital patients can seek treatment at other
institutions. Many nursing home residents, however, have no other
alternatives. They may lack the competence to assess the condi-
tions in which they live and to seek better facilities. Even if they
are dissatisfied, they may lack the financial means to move to a
different home or to live independently. Due to the dubious
nature of the voluntariness by which many nursing home residents
are confined, they may mistakenly believe that there is no alterna-
tive, or that their stay is temporary and can be endured. Because
of the more serious deprivation involved in nursing homes, the
state's involvement should be more exactingly scrutinized.
Finally, the argument for state action is strengthened by the
tradition of the past century of the state assuming from the private
sector-primarily religious and charitable organizations-responsi-
bility for the care of the blind, the orphaned, the insane, the tuber-
cular, the alcoholic, and the homeless and indigent aged.201 In the
most recent manifestation of this phenomenon, however, the state,
rather than directly providing these services itself, contracts with
private enterprise to meet its needs. For example, private com-
mercial prisons now often house "dangerous" juveniles for various
198 Compare the figures for nursing homes, Brown, supra note 81, at 304, with
those for hospitals, Mueller & Gibson, supra note 190, at 4.
199 McQtieen v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
200 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
20, See D. RoYHmAN, THE DiscovRY oF ThE ASYLuM (1971); see generally
W. THOMAS, NuRSING Ho~ms AND PUBoic Posacy: DRx= AN DEcmsioN x NEw
YomK STATE (1969).
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state agencies.2 02 At least one commentator has recognized the
similarity between the developing use of private prisons by the state
and the present nursing home morass.203 The expanding role of
the nursing home in the care of psychiatric and homeless persons
grows from a contractual relationship between the state and private
industry. For those residents whom the state transfers directly to
nursing homes from state mental institutions, that link is most
direct, and state action is clearly present. In that situation the
state cannot be permitted to avoid its constitutional duties by mask-
ing the element of state action through placement in a "private"
institution. At the other end of the spectrum-privately financed
patients who enter nursing homes through no conduct of the state-
the argument for state action is the weakest. But for those patients
in the middle ground, for example patients whom the state re-
classifies from involuntary to voluntary and then submits for nurs-
ing home residency, or who are discharged merely to avoid the
onerous cost of providing constitutionally compelled treatment and
who almost immediately become nursing home residents financed
by Medicaid, the unique characteristics of nursing homes and the
route by which they become residents militate in favor of finding
state action.
4. The Effectiveness of Treatment
Having established that for large numbers of nursing home
residents confinement is involuntary and traceable to state action,
this Article urges that constitutional rights such as the right to
treatment, which such patients enjoyed while confined in state
mental institutions, must follow the patients into the nursing homes.
This argument would be substantially undermined, however, if
treatment were of no value to mentally ill nursing home residents.
Constitutional duties do not serve purely ritualistic purposes; if a
duty fulfills no practical purpose, it is difficult to argue that is con-
stitutionally compelled. This is surely true with mentally ill nurs-
ing home residents; if treatment will neither improve a patient's
condition nor prevent further deterioration, a right to treatment is
of no value. Regrettably, a lack of knowledge about geriatrics
and mental illness among the elderly has resulted in a widespread
202 See K. WooDEN, WEEPING IN THE PrLAmn oF OvunuS 163-96 (1976).
2 0 3 See A. Rutherford, The Future of Incarceration: A Critical Issue in Juvenile
Justice Reform 11 (April 26, 1977) (unpublished paper presented at the Conference
on the University, Community and the Juvenile Justice System: New Directions in
Policy and Programs, University of Houston; copy on file, University of Pennsylvania
Law Review).
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assumption that many elderly senile patients are "too far gone" to
benefit from intensive treatment.
Even the mental health bar-ostensibly the advocates of men-
tally ill elderly patients-often succumbs to the theory that senility
is biologically determined and therefore untreatable. 20 4  This facile
assumption, however, is currently being challenged. 205 As E. W.
Busse, a leading authority on geriatric mental illness has noted,
environmental factors are important causes of senility: "Knowledge
is increasing regarding the biological aspects of brain function and
its relationship to the diseases of the body. Of equal importance
is the increasing recognition of the multiple causes of psychiatric
disorders in the elderly: socio-economic factors, environment, nutri-
tional variations, and the physiological changes of aging." 20- 8
Understood in this sense, senility is often a misleading description
of what ails the confused, disoriented elderly person. "Much of
what we call senility or senile psychosis is nothing more than the
reaction of aged people to isolation." 207 Regarding mental illness
among the elderly as irreversible organic impairment denies the
elderly an opportunity for treatment of their medical and psy-
chiatric disorders. Cases of chronic brain syndrome, for example,
are often accompanied by depression, paranoia, or other behavioral
reactions.208  These conditions can and should be treated. Fur-
thermore, labelling the old as sick or senile facilitates the decision
to institutionalize them, 209 even in cases where they neither need
nor want nursing home living. Increasingly, "the nursing home
provides not only care for the elderly who are ill, but also serves
204 For example, the plaintiffs in Wyatt urged the court to transfer geriatric
patients to more appropriate institutions; this request suggests that these patients
would be unamenable to treatment. The court obliged, noting that
Included in the Bryce Hospital patient population are between 1,500
and 1,600 geriatric patients who are provided custodial care but no treat-
ment. The evidence is without dispute that these patients are not properly
confined at Bryce Hospital since these geriatric patients cannot benefit
from any psychiatric treatment or are not mentally ill.
325 F. Supp. at 784 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, the same assumptions that
are made about senility are often made about mental illness. However, the view
that mental illness is socially and not biologically determined was propounded in
Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 Am. PsYcu. 113 (1960).
205 See text accompanying notes 206-25 infra.
2 06 E. BTlssE, GsnrATmc PsYcmATRY 69 (1969), quoted in M. HousE, supra
note 101, at 1-2.
207 W. G AssErj, PWAL THApuY 8 (1965), quoted in M. House, supra note
101, at 2.
2osM. House, supra note 101, at 3, quoting S. RF'. No. 433, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1971).
209 See Karcher & Linden, Family Rejection of the Aged and Nursing Home
Utilization, 5 Ir'L. J. AGMiG & HuAN DEv. 231, 234-35 (1974).
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the function of a repository for many of the healthy aged who are
displaced from a family setting." 210
This trend is reported in Peter Townsend's research of nurs-
ing home residents in England. Townsend found that
over half of those newly admitted are physically and men-
tally capable of leading an independent life, though many
of them require assistance with a few tasks....
[I]n physical and mental state the elderly residents
much more nearly resemble persons of comparable age liv-
ing at home than they do those living in hospitals. Only
just over a third of them are housebound.
Physical incapacity does not appear to be the dominant
reason for the admission of a large number of old people
to institutions .... 211
A similar finding of a relatively high level of functioning ap-
pears in a study of American nursing home residents.212  Social
isolation, homelessness, and financial insecurity rather than dis-
ability seem to precipitate admission.
213
The components of the right of treatment for this segment
must therefore be defined with greater specificity. At a minimum,
the mentally ill are entitled to the same protection from regression
as the mentally retarded. The mentally retarded, such as patients
with organic brain syndrome, suffer from a chronic condition for
which there is often no possibility of "cure" as such. Treatment
for the mentally retarded must therefore consist of protection from
harm, humane care, and active attempts to prevent deterioration and
to maximize functioning, even though functioning may remain at a
low level due to the irreversible nature of the impairment.214 Even
210 Id. 235.
211 p. TowNsEND, THE LAST L _uGE 283-84 (1962).
212 See Gottesman & Bourestom, Why Nursing Homes Do What They Do, 14
GnRONTOLOGIST 501, 503 (1974). In daily activities 47% of the sample of nursing
home residents needed little assistance, 34.1% needed some assistance, and 22.2%
were very dependent. About 20% of the sample were never observed in bed, while
60% were out of bed during 19 of 24 observations. Regarding their mental status,
47% were alert, 28% moderately alert, and 25% were confused. There was a strong
tendency for the most physically dependent to be the most confused. In recording
the daily activity of the resident, Gottesman and Bourestom found that 56% of the
residents' time during the day was spent doing nothing. Id.
213 P. ToWNsEND, supra note 211, at 285-327 (1962).
214 See New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp.
715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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in the most intractible cases, however, sheer custodial care is nor
sufficient. 215
Most nursing home residents, however, are not nearly so
impaired. As Townsend suggests, their vulnerability may have
been exaggerated in order to banish them to institutions and to
justify the minimal level of care that they receive in those set-
tings.21 Many types of treatment are available for the majority of
the elderly, including reality orientation, occupational therapy,
physical therapy, speech therapy, improved milieu, and, most re-
cently, the use of hyperbaric oxygen. 217  Far from being unamena-
ble to treatment, the chronic patient and the long-term patient are
the most responsive of all psychiatric patients to treatment. That
is, they seem to profit most from psychiatric intervention and to
suffer most from its neglect. The conclusion that the elderly men-
tally ill are responsive to treatment and can be rehabilitated is
supported by convincing evidence.
For example, a review of the literature reveals the importance
of active programs for ex-mental patients, particularly those who
were hospitalized for long periods prior to release. Significant dif-
ferences in regression rates appear depending upon whether ex-
mental patients are placed in institutional structures that seek to
develop self-care and personality skills to prepare patients for dis-
charge from mental hospitals.2 1  Similarly, long-standing research
on geriatric patients confirms the dramatic differences in level of
functioning between those patients who participated in active pro-
215 See Hefferin, Rehabilitation in Nursing Home Situations: A Survey of the
Literature, 16 J. Am. GunAwxucs Soc'y 296, 301-02 (1968).
Studies by Nordstrom, Rosenblatt and Taviss and Hoyt indicated that 20
to 70 per cent of nursing-home patients participating in rehabilitative
programs showed large physical, emotional and social gains, depending
upon the initial problem. Although Brody concluded that nursing homes
were good for severe physical illness but not for chronic disease or mental
illness, studies by Zeman and Galpern, Gottesman, May and Rhetts and
Stotsky constituted important therapeutic tests of a more inclusive nature;
their work revealed that even advanced disability could be arrested and
remissions could be attained through mental stimulation....
Hackley found that in a rehabilitation-oriented nursing home, 90 per
cent of patients could qualify for some rehabilitation therapy: 25 per cent
could be discharged to the community, 5 per cent could undertake voca-
tional training, and 60 per cent could be advanced to "Activities of Daily
Living" within the home.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
216 See P. TowNsEND, supra note 211.
2 1 7 See M. House, supra note 101, at 3-7. See also Gottesman, Organizing
Rehabilitation Services for the Elderly, 10 GRORNTOLOQiST 287, 288 (1970); Pfeiffer,
Generic Services for the Long-Term Care Patient, 14 MED. CA~x 160, 163 (1076).
218 See Lamb & Goertzel, Discharged Mental Patients-Are They Really in the
Community?, 24 Ancmvs GE . PsrcH. 29 (1971).
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grams and those who did not.219 Programs for nursing home resi-
dents include such commonsensical and inexpensive activities as a
sheltered workshop, allowing spending money for the patients, and
a ward store. These minor investments were successful in develop-
ing more active residents, increased social interaction, and greater
ego skills among patients.220
Reports of a three year experimental study show that treatment
for mental illness has the greatest impact on the aged and long-term
ex-mental patients.21 The aged and long-term hospitalized in the
most structured environment did better on all measures of function-
ing than any other group. The chronically mentally ill were more
likely to show improvement, were better adapted to community
life, and were less likely to be readmitted to mental hospitals than
the acutely mentally ill in the same environments. These findings
suggest the chronically mentally ill are more amenable to direct
psychosocial intervention than the acutely mentally ill. "Data...
indicate that a large number of patients can and do benefit from
socio-environmental treatment, particularly those who are older
and who have spent many years in an institution. 2
Persons with organic brain syndrome typically have been con-
sidered as beyond improvement by many health professionals. Re-
cently, however, Borys Kobrynski reported his successful treatment
of senile patients.22 3 Other authorities in the field have reached
similar conclusions. 24  Many of the problems of old people are
increasingly shown to be related to social isolation and sensory
deprivation. 2 5 Unlike the problems of acute psychotics, problems
of isolation may be treated with such obvious and inexpensive
"therapies" as planned friendly visits, active involvement of patients
in group activities, and exposure to mental stimuli. Such treatment
programs can be initiated for the elderly mentally ill in whatever
setting they may be located.
219 See Gottesman, The Mental Hospital's Role in Developing Programs for
Geriatric Patients, in Zusman & Bertsch, supra note 1, at 191-98.
220 Id. 193.
221 See Bourestom, Evaluation of Mental Health Programs for the Aged, 1
INr'L J. AG NG & HumrN DE v. 187, 191 (1970).
222 Id. (emphasis supplied).
223 See Kobrynski, The Mentally Impaired Elderly-Whose Responsibility?,
15 GRowrozoLoos 407, 409 (1975).
2 2 4 See Current Comment, Symposium on the Aging Poor, 23 SYRACUSE L.
RBv. 45, 55 (1972) (remarks of Dr. Alvin Goldfarb) ("[T]he behavior of older
persons, even if they have some brain damage, can be altered for the better." Id.).
225 See Bennett, Living Conditions and Everyday Needs of the Elderly With
Particular Reference to Social Isolation, 4 bqvrL J. Acimr & Huvmw DEv. 179
(1973).
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Unfortunately, right to treatment litigation is presently
weighted toward the care of the acutely mentally ill in mental hos-
pitals.226  Despite growing reports of success with older chronic
patients and the relative efficiency of these programs from a financial
perspective, the warehousing attitude toward the elderly has not
diminished. In fact, the movement to nursing homes may more
properly be regarded as a decision not to treat rather than as a less
restrictive alternative. As Pennsylvania State Senator Jeanette Reib-
man noted while discussing the impact of right to treatment liti-
gation in that state:
In reality, a choice was made as to who should not receive
care. The members of the profession would rather use
the words selection and priority, but what it all boils down
to is that the choice is made not to treat these large num-
bers of chronically ill patients in the mental institutions
of this State.
22 7
V. CONCLUSION
Over roughly the last decade and a half, the combined efforts
of the mental health bar, interested segments of the general popu-
lation, the judiciary, and various legislatures have forged significant
new protections and rights for mentally ill or retarded persons in-
voluntarily confined to state mental hospitals. This Article has
attempted to focus attention on one undesirable side effect of the
right to treatment movement: the dumping of many former mental
patients into nursing homes or other facilities where the right to
treatment is not recognized. Although receiving treatment in the
least restrictive setting consistent with the purposes of the patient's
program is a significant aspect of the right to treatment, that goal is
not realized by transferring patients to facilities in which con-
ditions-particularly treatment possibilities-are actually worse than
in the mental institution. The central thesis of this Article is that
for those former mental patients now residing in nursing homes
and for whom the nursing home is in effect "the back ward" of the
mental hospital, the constitutional right to treatment which they
enjoyed in the mental hospital is not extinguished by the transfer.
The strongest argument for this extension of the right to treatment
is undoubtedly the case of a mental patient who is directly trans-
226 See generally Kaplan, Institutional and Community Mental Health: The
Paradox in Wyatt v. Stickney, 9 CommzurN METALHETIJ.m I. 34 (1973).
227 Reibman, Rights of Mental Patients to Treatment and Remuneration for
Institutional Work, 39 PA. BAR Ass' Q. 538, 539 (1968) (emphasis in original).
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ferred by the state from a mental hospital to a nursing home against
his will, without knowing consent, or under conditions suggesting
the possibility of coercion, deceit, or other offensive conduct.
As this Article has attempted to show, however, even in the case
of persons whose nursing home admissions are, at least ostensibly,
voluntary, many factors surrounding the decision to institutionalize
an individual may lead to the conclusion that the admission is
de facto involuntary. It is submitted that courts should be willing to
probe into this possible involuntariness, particularly in the case of
"volunteered" patients and patients whose status the state has con-
verted from involuntary to voluntary during their hospitalization.
Admittedly the number of nursing home residents who would be
eligible for such a constitutional right to treatment is modest; most
nursing home residents do not enter the home via a mental hospital,
although many people who would a few years ago have been ad-
mitted to a mental hospital are now directly admitted to a nursing
home. These residents are not without protection, however. State
regulations and Medicare standards provide some protection. Al-
though these regulations have not adequately insured minimal
standards of care in the past, with more vigorous enforcement they
could undoubtedly benefit many nursing home residents. Further-
more, many patients may be able to assert contractual rights against
the nursing home and, in certain situations at least, a constitutional
right to protection from harm.
Another goal of this Article has been to sensitize the mental
health bar to a serious problem that has not received significant
legal attention. Litigation strategies must reflect the plight of
mentally ill persons beyond the walls of the asylum. The tragic
fate of many mental patients who were released to inadequate
nursing home facilities makes painfully clear the conclusion that
mental health victories won in the courtroom may not be sufficient
to improve the condition of the mentally ill. In addition to forging
new rights for the mentally ill, it is necessary to focus national
attention on the problems of that group. Ultimately, a satisfactory
solution to the problems confronting the mentally ill will be
reached only when we as a community guarantee the mentally ill
the rights they have been found to possess, but that have been
largely denied. Only then will mentally ill patients receive the
treatment that they require in the least restrictive setting consistent
with their needs.
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